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R USSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: A BRIEF HISTORY
Cindy Skach*
ABSTRACT
Why is the word impeachment so terrible? After all, if
the Congress passed such a motion it would have no
legal force. A popularly elected president could not be
removed from power by the Congress, especially this
Congress, which had long ago lost the people’s trust.1
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1. INTRODUCTION

For Americans who just lived through the second impeachment of
the nation’s 45th president, these words sound strangely familiar. But
the familiarity is no coincidence. Rather, it is part of the pathology
induced by the mechanics of the constitution and the office of the
presidency: its direct election and its fixed terms. In 2017, things had
become so problematic in Russia that British Prime Minister Theresa
May claimed Russia was threatening the international order.2 The
following year, the US Pentagon stated that Russia was more of a
threat to democracy than terrorism.3 To be sure, the democratic
opening in post-communist Russia has been an arduous, and by no
means linear, process. Back in 1994, just after the start of the transition
to democracy, the first Russian President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin still
considered Russia to be “legalized anarchy.”4 In 1998, the international
human rights organization Freedom House considered Russia to be
only a “partly free” transitional polity—a “work-in-progress.”5 For
years, analysts inside and outside Russia have been predicting a grim
future, sometimes fearing Latin American-style military intervention
or an extreme nationalist, quasi-fascist outcome.6

Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Speech at Lord Mayor’s
Banquet, 14 November 2017.
3 Adam Taylor, Pentagon says China, Russia are bigger problems for US than
terrorists. Voters may not agree, WASH. POST, January 20, 2018.
4 Yeltsin, supra note 1, at 6.
5 See the article by the President of Freedom House, Adrian Karatnycky,
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE NEW
INDEPENDENT STATES: A PROGRESS REPORT, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 1997: CIVIL
SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY AND MARKETS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 3-16 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction
Publishers, 1997); see also the cautious views of Russian ‘democracy’ expressed
by leading Russian political analysts in Liliya Shevtsova, ed., Rossiya: desyat’
voprosov o samom vazhnom (Moscow: Carnegie Centre, 1997).
6 Special: Russia’s Crisis, THE ECONOMIST, July 11, 1998, at 19–21.
2
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The difficulties Russia faces in its struggle towards democracy
result, to a great extent, from the multi-dimensional character of its
transition agenda. Russia has been faced not only with a political
transition, but with the almost simultaneous tasks of transforming its
economy, shaping a post-Cold War foreign policy, and resolving its
national question. Russia, to a much greater extent than many other
countries, has faced challenges posed by a completely unsettled sense
of identity and problems of “stateness.”7 As Archie Brown writes,
“[N]o other country in the world which has embarked on the course of
transition to democracy has had such a complicated, quadruple task.”8
So was it overdetermined? No. This article argues that it was not, but
rather, that Russia’s constitution—the form known as semipresidentialism—actually complicated Russia’s transition in the face
of these huge transition tasks, facilitating the turn to a pattern of
governance we might call constitutional dictatorship.9 When we

See RONALD GRIGOR SUNY, THE REVENGE OF THE PAST: NATIONALISM,
REVOLUTION, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION (Stanford University
Press, 1993); JOHN DUNLOP, RUSSIA: IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY? IN IAN
BREMMER AND RAY TARAS, EDS. NEW STATES, NEW POLITICS: BUILDING THE
POST-SOVIET NATIONS 29–95 (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Philip G.
Roeder, Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization, 43 World Politics 196–232
(January 1991); Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation, pp. 366–400 (A discussion of the difficulties “stateness” problems
posed for the democratic transition in Russia); see Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London:
Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983); and Ernst B. Haas, “What Is Nationalism and Why
Should We Study It?” International Organization Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 1986),
pp. 707–44. (general questions of identity and citizenship)
8 See JON ELSTER, THE NECESSITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM (1990); DOUGLAS GREENBERG, STANLEY N.
KATZ, MELANIE BETH OLIVIERO AND STEVEN C. WHEATLEY,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 157 (Oxford University Press, 1993)
9 See “Izmenenie Konstitutsii?”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Nov. 6, 1998, pp. 1–3; The
Russian Crisis: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning? 15(1) Post-Soviet
Affairs 55–71, 65–69 (1999) (Explaining that throughout the 1990s, an increasing
number of articles and documents calling for constitutional reform in Russia,
spanning across the ideological spectrum).
7
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examine Russia’s first decade on three conditions that are necessary
for the semi-presidential constitution to function well—the degree to
which its presidents have been genuine members of political parties,
the majority building capacity of Russia’s electoral system, and the
structural consolidation of Russia’s party system—Russia has had very
unfavorable values on each of these conditions. And this, in semipresidentialism, can be lethal.10
I.

THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S POLITICAL SPECTRUM

And if we look at the three distinct periods in Yeltsin’s
administration, for example, from 1991 to 1993, from 1993 to 1995, and
from 1995 to 1998, we see that President Yeltsin never enjoyed a stable
single party or even coalitional majority in either the Congress of
People’s Deputies (from 1991 to 1993), or the State Duma (from 1993 to
1999). The same is true for the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet from
1991 to 1993, and for the Russian prime ministers (from 1993 to August
1998). Between 1991 and 1993, the Congress, which had not been
elected in multi-party elections, had two main blocs. The first bloc was
the umbrella organization known as “Democratic Russia” (DR). The
second bloc was the Communist Party (KPRF). Both were diverse
groupings plagued by internal cleavages.11 The DR, which supported
Yeltsin’s election to the post of first Russian President, held about 40%
of the RSFSR Congress seats.12 It was described as “very amorphous,
very diffuse and [without] a formal organizational structure.’”13 The
KPRF, similarly, was beset by internal divisions based on “multiple
political-ideological tendencies.”14

CINDY SKACH, BORROWING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005).
11 See ARCHIE BROWN, THE GORBACHEV FACTOR 188–89 (1996).
12 JERRY F. HOUGH ET AL., THE 1996 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 32
(Brookings Institution Press 1996).
13 STEPHEN WHITE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: SHAPING A POST-SOVIET
FUTURE 161 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1993).
14 Joan Barth Urban & Valerii D. Solovei, Russia’s Communists at the Crossroads
37 (Westview Press 1997).
10
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Even after the first “quasi-multiparty” elections in 1993 to the
newly formed, 450-member State Duma (legislature), no single party
or coalition achieved a clear majority or was able to broker a majority
coalition.15 Yeltsin’s support coalition in this legislature included
Russia’s Choice, the Russian Unity and Agreement Party, and the
Democratic Party of Russia. Together these parties held only 22% of
the Duma seats, hardly enough for a stable majority. By the time of the
second State Duma elections in 1995, these three main parties in the
pro-president, pro-government coalition had been re-organized and
regrouped. The prime minister at the time, Viktor Chernomyrdin,
founded his own center-right party, “Our Home is Russia,” which
became the main pro-government party but which, in coalition with
Democratic Russia’s Choice, still only held 18% of the Duma seats. This
18% was not strongly united but rather included a heterogeneous set
of centrists and reformers. In fact, Chernomyrdin’s only serious
political power base was “his network of friends, allies, and clients in
the oil and gas industries.”16
Yevgeniy Primakov, the prime minister from September 1998 to
May 1999, formed a coalition cabinet that included the Communist
Party and enjoyed a majority in the State Duma. This majority was
tentative; Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party, the
largest party in the Duma, cautioned that the Communists would offer
the Primakov government only “selective support.”17 Nevertheless, it
was the first time in post-communist Russia’s history that a legislative
majority had been built. Unfortunately for the performance of semipresidentialism in Russia, Primakov was unexpectedly sacked by
Yeltsin in May 1999. Given this difficulty with building and sustaining
party majorities, Russia has spent most of its early post-communist life

See Brown, supra note 11 at 188 (arguing that these elections did not qualify as
“founding elections” understood as the first multi-party elections in the transition
from authoritarian rule. In 1993, the elections were at best “quasi-multiparty,”
and were characterized by high voter apathy as well as strong support for
nationalists and Communists.).
16 Elena Chinyaeva & Peter Rutland, A Prime Minister Without Politics, 3
Transition 32, 32–38 (1997).
17 David McHugh, Shokhin Quits Cabinet After Ten Days, THE MOSCOW TIMES
(Sept. 26, 1998).
15
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in a constitutional place I call divided minority government. See Table 1.
Importantly and problematically, Russia began its transition from
communism from this very unfavorable starting point within the semipresidential constitution. And this, as I detail below, laid the
foundations for today’s constitutional dictatorship under Vladimir
Putin.
So how did Russia’s prolonged placement in divided minority
government complicate Moscow’s capacity to deal effectively and
democratically with important tasks on its transition agenda? In the
section that follows, I analyze three important episodes in postcommunist Russian politics. The first of these episodes was the
political struggle between Boris Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov in
September and October 1993. I discuss why, and in what ways, the
political and constitutional conflict during this crucial period of the
First Russian Republic was structurally similar to the periods of
divided minority government in France in the 1950s and Weimar
Germany in the 1920s. I then discuss how this struggle pre-empted
reconciliatory politics and set a pattern of solving conflict through
force, paving the way for a hyper-presidential administration,
characterized by non-party cabinets and extensive policy-making by
presidential decree. Second, I suggest that Russia’s military imbroglio
in Chechnya from 1994 to 1995, and specifically Yeltsin’s declaration
of war on the breakaway republic, was an undemocratic, presidential
prestige strategy resulting from divided minority government, and of
Yeltsin’s perception of victory over the legislature in 1993. I conclude
with a discussion of Putin’s first presidency. I argue that in the wake
of prolonged periods of divided minority government, Putin’s early
efforts to recapture authority in Russia entrenched constitutional
dictatorship, ultimately thwarting chances of constitutional
democracy.
Table 1: Electorally Generated Subtypes of SemiPresidentialism
Russia 1991-1999
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Consolidated
Majority

Divided Majority

Divided Minority

President and PM
share the same
majority in
legislature

PM has a legislative
majority, president does
not

Neither PM nor
president has a
legislative majority

Sep. 1998-May 1999

June 1991-Sep. 1993
Dec. 1993-Sep. 1998
May 1999-May 2000

0 Days

240 Days

2919 Days

V. 29
Non-Democratic
HyperPresidentialism

(Sep.-Dec. 1993)
83 Days

I then return to the constitution itself and discuss why Russia could
not meet the necessary conditions for consolidated majority
government—the best place to be if you have a semi-presidential
constitution and care about democracy. The data is based on archival
work and interviews conducted in Moscow in the 1990s.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1993 AND YELTSIN’S USE
AND ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER

With the direct election of a powerful president in June 1991, postcommunist Russia—then officially known as the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.)—instituted a semipresidential constitutional framework and the First Russian
Republic.18 Under this framework, the government was responsible

See Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics 442 (Routledge 2020) (noting that the
1978 Russian constitution served as the base document, and it “had been amended
over 300 times, and the incremental nature of constitutional revision gave rise to
18
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and accountable to the Russian Supreme Soviet, the chairman of which
was the constitutional equivalent of a prime minister.19 This
chairman’s powers included proposing candidates to the most
important government posts and reporting to the Congress of People’s
Deputies on all matters concerning the state of the federation, foreign
and domestic affairs, and on defense and state security. These
functions “were assigned to the chairman before the presidency was
instituted in the Russian Federation, when the chairman of the
Supreme Soviet . . . was ‘the highest official person’ in the Russian
Republic.”20 In 1991, the president became the highest official of the
federation. Herein lies the origin of the dual-executive structure,
because “all other prerogatives of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet
were left intact . . . [and now] many of the chairman’s powers
overlapped [with] the powers of the president. The stage was set for
collision.”21
This particular Russian version of semi-presidentialism was
described by Russian legal scholar, and former member of the
Supreme Soviet, Alexander Yakovlev:
With two power structures, each of which strove to
obtain the age-old prize, “the totality of power,” a
predictable rivalry developed. The rivalry became
embodied in the persons of the president of the

numerous contradictions, notably vesting supreme power in both the legislative
and executive.”); see also Boris Nikolayevich Yelstin, Ispoved na zadannuiu temu
(1990) (recounting reform in the later years of the Gorbachev period).
19 See Bruce L. R. Smith, Law and Democracy in the New Russia 8 (Gennady M.
Danilenko, 1993) (noting that the dual power structure was, even early in the
R.S.F.S.R., thought of as “an incongruous arrangement that cannot function well
over the long run.”).
20 See Alexander M. Yakovlev et al., Striving for Law in a Lawless Land: Memoirs
of a Russian Reformer 129 (M.E. Sharpe, 1996) (explaining that Yakovlev was a
key advisor to Yeltsin’s hand-picked, constitutional committee, which drafted the
December 1993 Russian Constitution, and, in 1994, Yakovlev was appointed the
Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation to the
Federal Assembly.).
21 Alexander M. Yakolev, Striving for Law in a Lawless Land: Memoirs of a
Russian Reformer 130 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
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Russian Federation and the chairman of the Supreme
Soviet of the Russian Federation, who represented the
two warring structures. Both structures had the right
to promulgate acts that had the force of law. But who
was above whom? Whose laws would prevail?22
Constitutionally, both the president and the chairman of the
Supreme Soviet could issue direct orders to government ministries and
agencies.23 In addition, both the president and the Supreme Soviet
could initiate bills, and the president had limited veto over bills
proposed by the Supreme Soviet. The president also headed the
Security Council of the Russian Federation, had the right to declare a
state of emergency, and was commander in chief of the armed forces.
However, the president was not given the right to dissolve the
Congress or the Supreme Soviet. He could ask for the government’s
resignation, but this request had to be confirmed by the Supreme
Soviet. The fact that he was not given the right of dissolution, but that
he did have direct command over the armed forces and could
unilaterally declare a state of emergency, made the president
dangerously sovereign without giving him recourse to normal
democratic exits from conflictual situations.24 The Congress and the
Supreme Soviet, for their part, could force a government’s resignation
through a no confidence vote. Thus, the right of determining exit and
the tools for resolving government crises before they became regime
crises were awarded principally to the Congress and the Supreme
Soviet, but not the president.25 It follows that the president under this
constitutional structure had greater incentives to escalate conflict to a

Id. at 140.
Yitzhak M. Brudny, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoi, and Intraelite
Conflict in Postcommunist Russia, 1991–1994, in PATTERNS IN POST-SOVIET
LEADERSHIP 75, 86 (Timothy Colton & Robert Tucker eds., Westview Press,
1995).
24 John P. McCormick, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM AGAINST
POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY 121–23 (Cambridge University Press, 1997)
(“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception [Souverän ist, wer über den
Ausnahmezustand entscheidet].”).
25 Brudny, supra note 23, at 85.
22
23
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state of emergency, which then gave him a constitutional tool for
solving conflict.
Eventually, political differences between the Russian president
and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet escalated under this
constitutional framework. Their differences concerned, for the most
part, the timing and scope of economic reform. Both the president and
the chairman had their own diverging ideas concerning the path out
of communism, and particularly the path out of a command economy.
The Supreme Soviet, for its part, had never been a complacent body. It
had grown increasingly more assertive in trying to defend Russian
sovereignty from the U.S.S.R., and later, in trying to maintain national
cohesion in the face of centrifugal pulls from former autonomous
ethnic territories and Russian-populated regions of the federation.26
Importantly, a substantial faction of both the Supreme Soviet and the
Congress of People’s Deputies had strong ties to state industry and
collective and state farms, and this faction vehemently opposed any
economic policy that could result in widespread privatization or even
land reform.
Boris Yeltsin, for his part, had also never been complacent.
Yeltsin was elected in June 1991 with almost 60% of the valid votes. At
this time, the economic crisis in Russia was severe: the budget deficit
for 1991 was 26% of GDP, up from 8.5% in 1990.27 Yeltsin, promising
to manage this crisis, was at the height of his popularity and was still
on rather amicable terms with the R.S.F.S.R. Congress and Supreme
Soviet. In this period, on November 1, 1991, Yeltsin convinced the
Congress to grant him significant emergency powers for one year to
deal with the economic crisis.28 Strong presidential powers were
delegated to him, with the understanding that they could be revoked,

Galina Starovoytova, “Sovereignty After Empire: Self-Determination
Movements in the Former Soviet Union,” United States Institute of Peace,
Working Paper No. 19 (November 1997).
27 William Maley, The Shape of the Russian Macroeconomy, in RUSSIA IN SEARCH
OF ITS FUTURE 48, 53 (Amin Saikal & William Maley eds., Cambridge University
Press, 1995).
28 Scott Parish, Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-95, in EXECUTIVE
DECREE AUTHORITY 62, 71–77 (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds.,
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
26
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by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.29 The powers included the right to enact
special economic reforms by decree, to override previous legislation of
the Russian Federation, to create or cancel all executive bodies of
power, and to suspend any legal acts of local governments which
violated the constitution, or violated the sovereignty of the Russian
state, or both.30 The Supreme Soviet could overrule a presidential
decree, but it had to do so within seven days of its original issue.
Within the first year of Yeltsin’s term, there was little resistance
to Yeltsin’s use of these powers. According to economists involved in
Russia’s privatization, the Congress and Supreme Soviet did not at
that time believe that Yeltsin would try to push through a serious and
comprehensive privatization program that could affect state industries
and state farms, and lead to bankruptcy and unemployment.31 In fact,
Yeltsin had reassured the powerful Civic Union faction of the
Congress that he held views on economic reform similar to those of the
CU’s supporters—the industrial managers and workers.32
But by December 1992, the situation was substantially
different, as it became increasingly clear that Yeltsin was trying to
implement a notoriously difficult and painful economic restructuring
plan devised mainly by two young pro-market reformers, first his
Finance Minister Yegor Gaydar, and then Boris Fedorov. Boris
Fedorov “formulated a program for macroeconomic stabilization and
tried to implement it in any way possible.”33 Prices were freed, trade
was liberalized, defense expenditures were sharply cut, and large state
firms were denied easy credits. Yeltsin and his reformers had support
from several international financial institutions, such as the IMF and

Stephen White, Russia: presidential leadership under Yeltsin, in
POSTCOMMUNIST PRESIDENTS 38, 43–47 (Ray Taras ed., Cambridge University
Press, 1997).
30 Thomas F. Remington, Representative Power and the Russian State, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS 57, 74–76 (Stephen
White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman eds., Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1994).
31 MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUSSIA 5
(1995); cf. Moskovskie novosti (July 15, 1990).
32 Keesings Record of World Events, 39201 (Nov. 3, 1992); see Boycko, Shleifer
& Vishny, supra note 31, at 77.
33 ANDERS ÅSLUND, HOW RUSSIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY 55 (1995).
29
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foreign lending banks, but the plan, and Yeltsin’s attempts to
implement it, met with severe resistance from civil society and
especially from a political society dominated by nomenklatura with ties
to state enterprises. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet at the time, was a main player in this resistance.34 The Supreme
Soviet continued to block government legislation concerning
privatization throughout the later part of 1992 and, “[a]s a result, every
subsequent major regulation of privatization was introduced by
Presidential decree rather than parliamentary action.”35
Khasbulatov allied himself with the more conservative
factions of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, as well as with
enterprise managers and communist reformers from the Gorbachev
period. Their alliance was cemented by their shared anger and
perception that they had all been left out of the detailed designing of
reform which had been entrusted to a small group of young
economists. This group—the so-called Gang of Four— “had no roots
in a civil movement[.] [T]hey were there at the pleasure of the
president.”36 The so-called Gang was mostly made up of young, freemarket minded academics, including Yegor Gaydar and Anatoliy
Chubais. Yeltsin, following his constitutional prerogative, nominated
one of this Gang of Four, Yegor Gaydar, Acting Prime Minister in 1992.
Yeltsin then almost immediately agreed to demands by the Supreme
Soviet that future nominees to the post of prime minister be approved
by Congress, and that appointments to the so-called power
ministries—security, foreign affairs, internal affairs, defense—be
approved by the Supreme Soviet.37

The availability of this external support coalition—outside of his own
legislature and even outside of the boarders of his own country—was another
factor which reduced Yeltsin’s incentives to build up his own internal support
through political parties and social coalitions. The combination of Yeltsin’s
increased decree power and this international coalition may explain why, despite
Yeltsin’s apparent co-operation with the RSFSR legislature in 1991, severe
conflict had arisen by 1992.
35 Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, supra note 31.
36 John Lloyd, REBIRTH OF A NATION: AN ANATOMY OF RUSSIA 219 (1998).
37 The Constitutional Court appealed to Yeltsin, on one hand, and Rutskoy and
Khasbulatov, on the other hand, to resolve their differences for the sake of
34
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Yeltsin had hoped that this co-operative move would
encourage the Congress to confirm Gaydar, however much the
Congress and Supreme Soviet disliked him. The Congress instead
rejected Gaydar and forced the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin,
former Soviet Minister of Gas from 1985 to 1989, who had ties to state
industry and was more sympathetic to a slower paced economic
reform than Gaydar. In a further attempt to thwart Yeltsin’s economic
program, the Supreme Soviet appointed Viktor Gerashchenko as
chairman of the Central Bank of Russia on July 17, 1992.38
Gerashchenko quickly instituted a loose credit policy for enterprises, a
policy that fueled inflation, prevented or at least delayed many
bankruptcies, and undercut the reformers’ economic “shock
therapy.”39
In early 1993, Fedorov managed to convince Gerashchenko
and Chernomyrdin to issue a joint statement from the Central Bank
and the Russian Government establishing quarterly credit ceilings.
These ceilings were meant to help control the Central Bank’s monetary
policy and, in turn, keep inflation down. By July 1993, however,
Gerashchenko had broken the credit ceilings under pressure from the
agricultural and northern regional lobbies. The Supreme Soviet, for its
part, adopted a budget which called for a deficit of 25 percent of GDP,

political and economic stability. After several rounds of face-to-face negotiations,
Yeltsin and Khasbulatov decided to draft another constitution which would more
strictly delineate presidential and legislative powers, to be voted on in an April
1993 referendum. As the referendum approached, Rutskoy, the Constitutional
Court and the Civil Union proposed a round table to draft the constitution. Yeltsin
refused to take part. His former aide, Gennadiy Burbulis, commented that “…the
experience of east European countries had shown that ‘the round table is a
symptom of instability and not the right way to effect a change of authority.’”
Keesings Record of World Events, 39201 (Nov. 3, 1992).
38 See also YEGOR GAYDAR, DNI PORAZHENIY I POBED (1997) (stating that that
the appointment of Gerashchenko, which the author originally supported, had
been a major mistake).
39 See ANDERS ÅSLUND, HOW RUSSIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, 191–92
(Brookings Institution Press, 1st ed. 1995) (“The money supply (M2) increased
by no less than 28 percent per month during the five months from June to October
1992…[d]estabilization was rampant.”).
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which Fedorov refused to endorse.40 Gerashchenko ignored Fedorov
and government directives, and continued to print money to fund a
budget deficit that “the Parliament seemed intent upon elevating to an
irresponsible and unsustainable level.”41 On September 18, 1993,
Yeltsin appointed Gaydar to the government as First Deputy Prime
Minister and entrusted him once again with economic reform policy.
A “war of words” ensued between the Russian president, the cabinet,
the Russian Central Bank, and the Supreme Soviet. Public opinion
polls conducted in June and July 1993, in the midst of this crisis,
showed severe disappointment not only with the Russian economic
system, but also with the political system for its inability to resolve the
deadlock.42
A report in Izvestiya on 10 September 1993 described this
situation poignantly and is worth quoting at length:
Dual power is becoming too onerous a burden for the
country and the people. The split has long been
moving rapidly downward from the federal level,
penetrating the thick of our public life. We now have
two of everything[.] Lines have been drawn in the
creative unions. The speaker meets with his writers
and the President with his. It won’t be long before we
have two central television companies, two
prosecutor’s offices, two supreme courts and two
governments[.] Sociological measurements of public
moods, not to mention one’s own daily experience,
confirm that political apathy is on the rise.

ANDERS ÅSLUND, HOW RUSSIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY 191–92
(Brookings Institution Press, 1st ed. 1995).
41 William Maley, The Shape of the Russian Macroeconomy, in RUSSIA IN
SEARCH OF ITS FUTURE, 57–58 (Amin Saikal & William Maley eds., 1995).
42 See RICHARD ROSE, IRINA BOEVA AND VIACHESLAV SHIRONIN, HOW RUSSIANS
ARE COPING WITH TRANSITION: NEW RUSSIAN BAROMETER II, 40 (Glasgow:
University of Strathclyde Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1993) (On a scale
of +100 (very positive) to –100 (very negative), the mean score Russians
considered their system of government to be was –16).
40
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People…are looking at what is happening at the top
with bewilderment and disgust. They are demanding
an end to the [institutional] war[.]43
The fact that Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet both wanted to
determine the timing and construction of the new political, economic
and federal system is a logical consequence of the fact that they both
had a constitutional right to do so. Conflict arose because these two
executives had opposing political ambitions, were caught in an
extremely inelastic economic situation, and could not count on the
support of a clear and stable majority of deputies. Within two years,
the situation had reached a point of no return: “[t]he two institutions,
the Supreme Soviet and presidency, were locked in a struggle for
victory which one or other had to win.”44 Eventually, this mnogovlastiye
(multiplicity of powers) and dvoyevlastiye (dual power, such as that
between president and legislature) led to “what many Russians
preferred to term byezvlastiye, an absence of effective and legitimized
power[.]”45 The result was a general vacuum of legitimacy in the
political system.46
This time, however, Yeltsin made sure that he would not have
any interference from the Congress or Supreme Soviet. His
appointment of Gaydar on September 18 was followed, three days
later, by Presidential Decree 1400, which dissolved the Congress of
People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, censored the press, leaned
on the constitutional court, and called for new, nation-wide elections
and a new constitution. The Congress responded by passing an
impeachment motion against Yeltsin and inaugurating the then vice-

Yuri Orlik, What We Can Expect from the Russian President’s September
Offensive, IZVESTIA, Sep. 10, 1993, at 10; see also Current Digest of the PostSoviet Press, Vol. XLV, No. 36 (1993), p. 11.
44 John Lloyd, Rebirth Of A Nation: An Anatomy Of Russia, 35 (M. Joseph, 1st
ed. 1998); see Vladislav M. Zubok, Russia: Between Peace and Conflict, in
WHOSE WORLD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE COLD
WAR, 115 (Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sörensen eds., 1995).
45 Archie Brown, The October Crisis of 1993: Context and Implications, in PostSoviet Affairs Vol. 9, No. 3, 183, 186 (1993).
46 See also Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 7, 1993.
43
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president, Aleksandr Rutskoy, as President of the R.S.F.S.R. A
dramatic series of events followed. Yeltsin sent more than 2,000 troops
to surround the Congress building, where deputies had closed
themselves off in protest and defiance of the president, having access
only to journalists’ portable cellphones to communicate with the
public and the world about the situation.
The public address which Yeltsin gave on September 22,
attempting to justify this unilateral decision to close down the
Congress, demonstrated his unwillingness to accept political
opposition as legitimate, to respect the constitution and the right of
other institutions to question, challenge, and even object to his own
politics. In this address, Yeltsin claimed that the legislature “has been
seized by a group of persons who have turned it into the staff of the
irreconcilable opposition. Hiding behind deputies, this group is
pushing Russia towards the abyss . . . [and it] has lost its right to be in
control of crucial levers of state power.”47
The fact that Yeltsin used force to solve the problem and
frustrations of divided minority government had serious, negative
implications for the rule of law and thus for Russia’s democratic
transition.48 But the crucial point I would like to stress about this
“September Offensive” is that it originated from divided minority
government―that extremely frustrating situation of constitutionally
granted power, on the one hand, and powerlessness due to a lack of
legislative support, on the other hand. This makes one wonder
whether the semi-presidential constitution, which combined
presidential and parliamentary incentives, was a wise choice for a new
state without a real party system. “The principles of parliamentary and
presidential government are both equally valid, but the tragedy for
Russia was that both were being pursued with equal vigor at the same

Boris Yeltsin quoted in the Financial Times (London) 22 September 1993, p.
2; see also Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Khasbulatov’s
response to Yeltsin’s decree in Rossiiskaya gazeta, September 23, 1993, p. 1.
48 Archie Brown, Political Leadership in Post-Communist Russia, in RUSSIA IN
SEARCH OF ITS FUTURE, 28–47, esp. 43–44 (Amin Saikal & William Maley eds.,
1995).
47
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time: like two trains approaching on the same track, the collision
would be disastrous for both.”49
As the former Financial Times correspondent for Russia wrote,
the September Offensive was “aimed at breaking the Gordian knot of
political tensions and enmities now so large and tight that a chainsaw,
not a sword, is required.”50 Indeed, the “Gordian knot” is an accurate
description of divided minority government, because institutional
conflict becomes so intertwined and complicated in this subtype that
it cannot simply be “undone,” but rather may encourage drastic
solutions. Thus, divided minority government is likely to lead out of
the democratic box, into non-democratic, presidential dominance and
extensive use of emergency and decree powers. Empirical evidence
tells us that indeed, Yeltsin decided to solve the dilemma of divided
minorities this way: by unilaterally closing down the legislature,
restricting the operation of the constitutional court, censoring the
media, and ruling by decree with a small group of hand-picked
advisors. Yeltsin’s unilateral action can be likened to that of Alexander
the Great in the fable of the Gordian knot, who favored drastic action
over cautious deliberating. As Yeltsin himself wrote, “[i]f the
parliament does not exist, there is not, there must not be, any dialogue
with it.”51
In the aftermath of the September Offensive, Boris Yeltsin
called for a new constitution to be drawn up and put to a national
referendum.52 Yeltsin took complete control of this constitutional
process.53 Backed by the popular support he received in a “plebiscite”

RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 48 (3d ed. 2002).
John Lloyd, Rock Solid Against Yeltsins’ Reforms, FINANCIAL TIMES
(LONDON), Sept. 6, 1993, at 21.
51 John Lloyd, Yeltsin Confident As Direct Rule Wins Military Support,
FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 23, 1993, at 1 (quoting Boris Yeltsin).
52 It was actually called a plebiscite and not a referendum in order to avoid the law
on referendums. See Michael Dobbs, Yeltsin Challenges His Foes In Congress,
Calls For Referendum, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 1992), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/12/11/yeltsin-challenges-his-foes-incongress-calls-for-referendum/1ad742d4-821f-4f48-96b0-1a80b4c66db1.
53 Izvestiya [Constitution], July 16, 1993, at 3–6; cf. Izvestiya [Constitution], Nov.
10, 1993, at 3–5.
49
50
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in April 1993, which in reality had the effect of a referendum, Yeltsin
believed he had been given a carte blanche popular mandate to write
this constitution. In this referendum, nearly 59% of those voting (but
only 38% of the electorate) said they had confidence in Yeltsin.54 “For
Yeltsin and his supporters this was a verdict that justified pressing
ahead with a constitution that provided for a presidential republic
with a much more limited legislature, and by the end of that year they
had obtained that objective.”55
The process of drafting, discussing and approving a new
constitution is extremely important in the constitutional moments of
transitional democracies. Elites have, in these moments, a chance to
demonstrate their democratic commitment to the nation.56 The more
transparent and plural the constitution-making process is, the more
respect shown by the new leaders—not only for the democratic ideal,
but for the citizens qua citizens of the nation. In the ideal constitutionmaking environment, a democratically elected constituent assembly
freely debates and discusses different draft-constitutions, attempts to
decide difficult or contentious points through consensual rather than
majoritarian mechanisms, and submits the final draft to a referendum
for legitimization by a clear majority of the electorate.57 Usually a new
democracy meets some to most of these conditions. Spain, in 1979,
met all of them. Russia, in 1993, met none. Yeltsin drew up the 1993
Constitution under an opaque veil, since there was no election of a
constituent assembly.
Indeed, the legislature played no role in drafting or approving
the constitution. Even the first draft by Yeltsin’s hand-picked
constitutional committee was discarded, apparently because it

White, Rose & MacAllister, How Russia Votes, Table 4.2 (1997).
Id. at 46.
56 See Jon Elster, Afterword: The Making of Postcommunist Presidencies, in
Postcommunist Presidents 225–37 (1997); Juan J. Linz, Introduction: Some
Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe, in Postcommunist
Presidents 1–14 (1997).
57 The requirements for an ideal constitution-making environment have been
previously evaluated. See LINZ & STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION 81–83 (1978) (of all the countries treated here,
only Spain in 1979 met the criteria.).
54
55
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restricted presidential power and gave more power to the
legislature.58 Yeltsin’s final document was submitted to a plebiscite,
and Yeltsin later argued that it had been approvedin a “referendum”
by the required majority of votes. In reality, however, there was a very
low turnout rate for this national consultation. Official figures claimed
that turnout was about 54%, but even if this were true, that meant
that the constitution was actually only approved, and this
legitimized, by 31% of the electorate.59 Some observers even doubt
whether the 50% requirement had really been met.
What were the main elements of this constitution, drafted in
secrecy and approved by only 31% of the Russian electorate? Russia’s
1993 constitution can be considered a variation towards a strongly
presidential semi-presidential system, both de jure and de facto. That is,
constitutional powers are significantly unbalanced in favor of the
president. The president enjoys significant legislative-initiative and
legislative-blocking power and has rather free-handed decree power.
The constitution simply states, for example, that “the president of the
Russian Federation issues decrees and directives” (Article 90.1),
whichare “mandatory throughout the territory” (Art. 90.2) and which
“must not contravene the constitution of the Russian Federation and
federal laws” (Art. 90.3).60 This means that almost no objections can
legally be made to presidential decrees, nor any limits placed on their
frequency.
Moreover, the one body that can decide whether or not a
presidential decree contravenes the constitution or federal law is the
Constitutional Court, the judges of which must be chosen by the
Federation Council from the candidates submitted by the president
(Art 83.f). Only presidential decrees concerning the introduction of
martial law, or a state of emergency must be “confirmed” by the
Federation Council (Art. 102.b, c). The requirements concerning this

Interview with Galina Starovoytova, Member of this Constitutional Committee
in 1993, in Moscow (Mar. 26, 1998).
59 See WHITE, ROSE & MCALLISTER, A WEAK YES FOR A CONSTITUTION IN HOW
RUSSIA VOTES, 87, 106 (1997).
60 JOHN LLOYD, REBIRTH OF A NATION: AN ANATOMY OF RUSSIA, 105-06 (M.
Joseph ed., 1st ed. (1998).
58
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confirmation are ambiguous given the president a wide scope
regarding what situations constitute national emergencies, as in
Weimar Germany.61
In general, some checks to presidential power by the
government, the Constitutional Court, the State Duma, and the
Federation Council do exist, but the language concerning necessary
countersignature from these bodies is often ambiguous. Moreover, the
checks to presidential power often involve complicated procedures.62
For example, impeachment of the president is only possible on the
basis of a charge of treason or “grave crime.” This charge must be filed
by at least one-third of the State Duma’s total membership, confirmed
by a ruling of the Supreme Court, confirmed by a ruling of the
Constitutional Court, confirmed by a ruling of a special committee of
the State Duma, and approved by two-thirds of the total membership
of both the State Duma and the Federation Council. All these
procedures, and the final ruling by the Federation Council, must take
place within three months of the initial filing of the charge by the State
Duma, otherwise the charge against the president is rejected.
Another crucial power awarded to Yeltsin in the 1993
constitution comes from Article 85.1, which allows the president of
the Russian Federation to use “conciliation procedures to resolve
disagreements” between the center and the federal units.63 Using this
power, Yeltsin was able to grant special “semi-autonomous” status to
Tatarstan, allowing Tatarstan to regulate its own trade and establish
its own state bank. Treaties between the Kremlin and other republics,
oblasts and krais followed. Such bilateral deals may have been
necessary for mitigating inter-elite tensions and may have helped
avoid the type of bloodshed witnessed in Chechnya’s secession war
with Moscow. But these bilateral treaties also appear to be working
against the development of a democratic federation in which the
subunits are able to protect themselves from transgressions by the
center,because “…the pervasiveness of the federal government’s web

See Maurice Duverger, Les régimes semi-présidentiels, 13 (1987).
See Colton, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s All-Thumbs Democrat, 49-74 (1995).
63 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, App. 3 (London: Routledge,
1996).
61
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of bilateral deals with the regions—epitomized by the bilateral
treaties—amounts to a selective provision of private goods that
effectively substitutes for the public goods that might create incentives
for inter-regional collective action.”64
Several presidential powers are checked by the Federation
Council rather than by the State Duma.65 Again, this was Yeltsin’s
preference. Realizing the need for majority support and noting the
simultaneous lack of such support in the State Duma, Yeltsin arranged
this prerogative to be given to the Federation Council. The Federation
Council was composed at the time of very few political party
representatives and was instead dominated by independent regional
elites who generally favored Yeltsin’s politics because they had been
appointed by him.66 From 1995 to 2000, members of the upper house
were chosen from the heads of executive and legislative governments
in each of the 89 regions, which were themselves chosen through
competitive elections. In elections that took place for governors during
2000, twenty-eight of the forty-four winners were incumbents. None
was openly critical of the Kremlin. As of July 2000, governors agreed
to surrender their seats in the Federation Council to representatives
who would sit on the council for them. Someanalysts feel that this
body, which should provide an important check to the power of the
Kremlin, and which has so far been rather supportive of Kremlin
policies, is now in danger of extinction in the face of an extremely
strong president. The relative strength of the Russian president
becomes apparent when we compare it to other semi-presidential
systems. If we measure the de jure powers of the presidents of Russia,
the French Fifth Republic, and Weimar Germany, we note that the
Russian president is constitutionally almost twice as powerful as the
president of the French Fifth Republic, and at least one- third more
powerful than the president of the Weimar Republic.

Steven L. Solnick, Hanging Separately? Cooperation, Cooptation, and
Cheating in Developing Federations, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association in Boston, MA (Sep. 3–6, 1998).
65 See Viiktor Sheinis, Moscow News No. 46, (Nov. 12, 1993).
66 RFE/RL Research Report (Feb. 4, 1994).
64
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At first glance, this comparative data would seem to support
arguments that strong presidential powers are related to democratic
breakdown. However, the crafting of such strong presidential powers
into the 1993 Russian Constitution must be seen as a consequence of
Yeltsin’s experience with divided minority government. Moreover, in
spiteof these strong de jure powers, Yeltsin often found himself quite
impotent, because he lacked a coherent Duma majority. It was from
this position of impotence that he often resorted to appointing nonparty ministers that were loyal only to him; to sacking prime ministers
at whim, even when they proved to be working cooperatively with
the Duma;and to ruling extensively by decree, as a substitute for a
Duma majority. In addition, if we look at Weimar Germany, the
president was much less powerful than in Russia, and only slightly
more powerful than in France. Yet, Russia has managed to move back
from hyper-presidentialism, whereas Weimar never could. Thus, the
de jure powers of presidents alone cannot explain democratic
breakdown.
One can make a plausible argument that in spite of the
frustration from thisimpotence, Yeltsin managed to keep his autocratic
tendencies at bay and thus keep Russia from moving completely and
permanently into the non-democratic box through his “very sensitive
instinct (rather than other capacity) about how far he can go in either
direction.”67 This perhaps allowed him to toe the fine line between
authoritarian rule (which would prevent him from staying on
amicable terms with the Group of Seven, NATO and the EU) and
democracy (which might, given legislative and social opposition to
economic reforms,have made him cut economic reform programs.)
International monetary organizations, such as the IMF, have had
rather unrealistic expectations with respect to the Russian economy.
But Russian society has also been somewhat unrealistic in terms of its
expectations.
Indeed, after Yeltsin’s overwhelming victory and surge of popular
support in the 1991 election, he did have, at that time, a window of

Andrey Grachev, “Russian Society: Which Way out of Communism?”,
Presentation at the Russian and East European Centre Seminar at St Antony’s
College, Oxford, (Oct. 20, 1997).
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opportunity. He might have attempted to change the historical legacy
in Russia of a highly centralized, cult of personality-type political
leadership, towards a democracy built upon the sovereignty ofthe
people represented in legislature. In this window of opportunity,
Yeltsin might have attempted to legitimate the legislature, establishing
it as an important democratic institution. What would have happened
if a different constitutional structure had been chosen in 1991? As
Stephen White argues, “[f]or Khasbulatov, Russian history, and then
Marxism-Leninism had combined to exaggerate the power of a single
‘tsar.’” Therefore, it was essential, in these circumstances, to establish
a secure division of powers and thento develop the role of parliament
as a ‘representative organ’ of the whole society. Parliament, in
particular, could serve as a ‘counterweight’ to the executive,
exercising its influence over public spending, legislation, and the
composition of government as parliaments did in other countries.68
Yeltsin did not, however, accept the challenge of developing and
fortifying an institutionalcounterweight to his own power. Let me now
discuss several episodes that illustrate how Yeltsin instead led Russia
to hyper-presidentialism.
III.

THE CHECHEN CRISIS

Chechnya claimed full independence from the Russian Federation
on March 12, 1992, under the leadership of its president, General
Dzhokhar Dudaev.69 Immediately following Chechnya’s declaration,
Yeltsin followed suit by imposing a state of emergency in the region
and sending Russian troops to Grozny, the Chechen capital. The
Russian Supreme Soviet refused to approve Yeltsin’s decree, these
troops were immediately withdrawn, andfor the two and a half years

But cf. Stephen White et al., How Russia Votes 46, 47 (1997) (discussing mixed
popular support for a “strong leader who could make decisions and put them
quickly into effect” as opposed to “parliament and elections.”).
69 NEW STATES, NEW POLITICS: BUILDING THE POST-SOVIET NATIONS 712 (Ian
Bremmer & Ray Taras eds., 1997) (In 1989, the Russian population in ChechenIngushetia were a minority (22%), while Chechens, were a majority (55%). A
remaining 12% were Ingush, 1% Armenian, 1% Ukrainian, and 9% “others”).
68
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that followed, Russia pursed a policy of peaceful co-existence with
Chechnya.70 Then on December 11, 1994, one year after Yeltsin had
shelled his own legislature and orchestrated the adoption of a
constitution that gave him strong powers, he again sent Russian troops
into Chechnya. This time, neither the State Duma, nor the
Constitutional Court, nor the Federation Council, was asked to
approve Yeltsin’s declaration. Russian public opinion polls showed
a 65% disapproval rate for the use of force in Chechnya, but public
opinion was ignored.71 Within the Chechen Republic, Russian
troops committed gross violations of human rights and repeatedly
breached international humanitarian law.72 Most of the Russian
media’s accounts of the Chechen War were distorted by government
censorship.73
What led to the Kremlin’s decision to declare war on this breakaway federal state, especially given that the overwhelming consensus
in the State Duma, as well as the majority of the public, were strongly
against the use of force? Moreover, why did the Kremlin pursue a
policy of peaceful co-existence with Chechnya from 1991 until 1994,
and then breach co-existence violently in 1994? The Russian military
intervention of Chechnya must be seen in the context of the September-

See generally Gail W. Lapidus, Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of
Chechnya, 23 Int’l Sec. 5, 15–16 (1998) (discussing Yeltsin’s aborted military
intervention in Chechnya).
71 See generally Leonid Nikitinsky, Frustrated Generals Take Aim at Journalists,
Moscow News (Feb. 3, 1995), https://advance-lexis-com.access.library.miami.
edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJF-1SR0-0061-K1J
H-00000-00&context=1516831 (discussing the information war between Russian
generals and independent journalist reporting on the Chechen Campaign).
72 See generally Svante E. Cornell, International Reactions to Massive Human
Rights Violations: The Case of Chechnya, 51 Eur.-Asia Stud. 85, 87–91 (1999)
(discussing human rights abuses in Chechnya during Russia’s Chechen
Campaign).
73 See Nikitinsky, supra note 71; see also NATIONS IN TRANSIT 1997: CIVIL
SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY AND MARKETS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 318–20 (Adrian Karatnycky et al. eds., 1997)
(suggesting that the media is still censored by the federal and regional
governments and the courts).
70
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December 1993 crisis, the year prior to the intervention, considering
the anticipation of the presidential electionsof 1996. It must be seen in
the context of divided minority government.
In the face of increasing nationalist sentiments in the electorate,
and increased dissatisfaction with the economy, Chechnya presented
an opportunity for Yeltsin and the reformers in 1994. “By the time of
the Chechen crisis, the power group exhausted itself in domestic and
foreign policies…,” and Yeltsin needed to find some prestige strategy
to re-legitimize his use of exceptional powers and extended use of
presidential decrees.74 Just one year earlier, Yeltsin had solved the
showdown with the Russian legislature unilaterally,through the use of
force. In the end, he achieved his goal (a constitution granting him
substantial powers which dwarfed those of the legislature in
comparison) and prestige in the international community for having
saved Russia from the apparent threat of reactionary forces. This
support from the international community gave Yeltsin an inflated
sense of his actual domestic legitimacy: having won the game he
played with the Russian legislature in 1993 through force, Yeltsin must
have felt that the same technique could be successfully used again in
Chechnya. After all, “Yeltsin found out that knots are easier to cut than
to untie,” and thus, “he doesn’t even want to try to untie them.”75
Another motivation Yeltsin had for engaging in war with
Chechnya as a prestige strategy was the fact that the 1993 elections to
the State Duma gave the relatively unknown Vladimir Zhirinovsky
and his nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, which had asa top policy
priority the restoration of the former Soviet empire, 23% of the
popular vote for the PR elections and a total of 14% of the Duma
seats.76 These results suggested an increasing popularity of nationalist
ideas in the electorate, and “…demonstrated to Yeltsin’s Kremlin of

Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow News No. 1, 3 (Jan. 6, 1995).
Interview with Sergey Kovalev in Moscow (Mar. 26, 1998).
76 BRUCE D. PORTER, RUSSIA AND EUROPE AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE
INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES (Celeste A. Wallander, ed.);
The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, 135 (Boulder:
Westview Press, ed., 1996); see also Election data from White, Rose and
McAllister, How Russia Votes, p. 123.
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advisers that Yeltsin had to change his liberal image, rhetoric, and
allies in order to win the next presidential election.”77 That is,
“[t]hroughout 1993 and most clearly after the defeat of reformist
parties in the December elections, politicians inthe Yeltsin camp were
compelled to pay greater attention to the views of the nationalist
right—especially on the question of Russian minorities in the former
Soviet republics.”78 In this context, at least two incentives emerging
from the semi-presidential institutions— the conflict structured
between the two executives which led to an ever-escalating struggle
for power, and the need to win crises to improve chances for
presidential re-election—seem to have been crucial in Yeltsin’s
decision to intervene militarily in Chechnya in 1994.79 One close
advisor to Yeltsin sincerely believed that Yeltsin wanted a war for
prestige reasons, and that “Yeltsin even calculated that it would only
take him eight days to win this war.”80

Michael McFaul, A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of
Russian Foreign Policy, 22 (3) MIT Int’l Security 5, 28-29 (1998).
78 Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian
Behaviour and the End of the Cold War, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 177
(1997); see also Gail W. Lapidus, Contested Sovereignty, 23 Int’l Security 5, 17
(1998) (Lapidus states that one of the factors leading to the shift in Russia’s policy
toward Chechnya was “[t]he impact of the December 1993 elections, which
persuaded Yeltsin to jettison his liberal image, supporters, and advisers in favor
of a more nationalist and authoritarian strategy and greater reliance on hardline
political figure[s].”).
79 Interview by Sergey Filatov with Lyudmila Telen of Moscow News No. 6 (Feb.
10) (Sergey Filatov, Head of the Presidential Administration, when asked in an
Interview why Russia had allowed Chechnya special status for three years and
then intervened, replied that “[t]here were objective circumstances for this: a
grave economic situation in Russia and the opposition in the branches of power.”).
80 Interview with Sergey Kovalev in Moscow (Mar. 26, 1998) (Kovalev believed
that Yeltsin provoked the crisis because he wanted a war and thought it would be
an easy victory. He commented, “The Security Council realized that Yeltsin
wanted a war, so they decided ‘OK, we support the war.’ This was the game.” The
idea of provoking, and then trying to solve, a crisis to win popular support was,
to a certain extent, also a legacy of communist-era decision-making.).
77
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The final decision to invade Chechnya was taken only by Yeltsin,
and “[t]he natureof the decision-taking on the war was fatally cast in
the mold of the Byzantine court Yeltsin had created, or allowed to be
created, around him—and in this case, no liberal voices were allowed
to penetrate.”81 This was the culmination of a process that Yeltsin had
gradually created since 1992, in his drive to centralize decision making
and keep itvertical, directly under his administration. The Foreign
Ministry, although not originally concerned with Chechnya, was
stripped of some of its co-ordination duties. These duties were placed
in the lap of the Russian Security Council, which was already part
of thepresidential administration and under direct supervision of the
president.82
As mentioned earlier, public opinion on the war in Chechnya was
ignored.83 Opinion polls conducted in the summer of 1994, several
months before the invasion, showed that only 5% of those polled
believed that “Moscow must at any price—including the use of force—
preserve Chechnya within the Russian Republic.”84 However, the
decision to invade and carry out a war with the Chechen Republic was
made independently of public opinion, and for that matter,
independently of the State Duma, and of the major liberal forces
in Russia.85 One might wonder why Yeltsin, if he was indeed
pursuing a prestige strategy,

Lloyd supra note 60, at 194.
JEFFREY T. CHECKEL, IDEAS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CHANGE, 111
(Yale Univ. Press 1997).
83 See Jack Snyder, Democratization, War, and Nationalism, in Celeste A.
Wallander, Democratization, War, and Nationalism, 21–40, (Public opinion was
ignored in spite of Kozyrev’s declaration that “as a democrat he felt constrained
to take into account public opinion of foreign policy matters.”); see also Interview
by Segodnya with Kozyrev (Apr. 30, 1994) (Moreover, Kozyrev “spent 1992 and
1993 touting the value of democratic norms in domestic and international affairs,
yet by the beginning of 1994 he was forced to jump aboard the nationalist, proSerb, neo-imperial bandwagon like virtually everyone else in Russian politics.”).
84 IAN BREMMER & RAY TARAS, NEW STATES, NEW POLITICS, 62 (Dec. 28, 1996).
85 Emil’ Pain and Arkady Popov, Vlast’I obshchestvo na barrikadakh, Izvestiya, 4
(Feb. 10, 1995); see also Michael McFaul, A Precarious Peace, 29 (1998).
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ignored public opinion and risked alienating his support base. His
moves seemcounterintuitive, especially since two of the major proreform parties in the State Duma which generally supported Yeltsin,
Yavlinski’s Yabloko and Russia’s Choice, were alsostrongly opposed
to Yeltsin’s decision on Chechnya, and regarding it as a move
toward authoritarian presidentialism.86
Members of the Russian cabinet also resisted the war.
Several of them, including Russian Minister of Justice Yuri
Kalmykov, chose to resign rather than individually or collectively
challenge Yeltsin.87 Sergey Kovalev, Yeltsin’s advisor on human
rights and member of Yeltsin’s presidential council, also resigned. In
hisletter of resignation to Yeltsin he included a strong criticism of the
conflict, which he tied back to the constitutional tensions. And “[l]ater,
after he had himself been comprehensively bloodied in Chechnya,
Kovalev reflected: ‘I had been thinking in straightlines. I could not
see that dissolution of parliament [in 1993] led to Chechnya.’”88 In his
letter, Kovalev stated his disgust with the Chechen crisis, pointing to
what he felt was a missed opportunity to push the country on the road
to democracy. He laid blame for the failure directly with Yeltsin:
In this conflict we have seen in full measure contempt
for the law, flouting of the constitution...what is
particularly horrifying is another aspect of the régime
you’vecreated, which has been revealed by this crisis:
utter contempt for human life...The totalitarian order,
which was dealt a serious but possibly not fatal blow,
is defending itself...Your personal guilt lies in
encouraging these tendencies instead of checking

See John Lloyd, When The Centre Does Not Hold: Russia’s Military Action in
Chechnya Threatens its Own Insecure Democracy, Financial Times, (Dec. 20,
1994) (“For Mr. Yegor Gaydar, leader of Russia’s Choice; for Mr. Grigory
Yavlinsky, leader of Yabloko; for Mr. Otto Latsis, Russia’s leading liberal
columnist; for Mr. Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the State Duma’s (lower
house) defence committee, the threat is clear: it is of an authoritarianism that bases
itself on the need to prepare the country for war against its enemies.”).
87 Id.
88 Lloyd supra note 60, at 97.
86
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them. It’s sad for me that you have lost your soul, that
you are unable to evolve from a Communist Party
secretary into a human being. You could have done
so.89
Strong opposition to the war in Chechnya was even evident from
the Russian Minister of Defense, General Pavel Grachev, who, it was
said later by insiders, did not really want to go to war. Though
desperately unpopular and relatively inexperienced, he was enough
of a soldier to realize the problems. But he was trapped in a
particularly hard place; and he volunteered his men in much the same
spirit as a Stalin-era tractor plant director might have pledged to
double output.90 Of course, the war in Chechnya was a complicated
and multi-faceted conflict that cannot be reduced to having any single
cause. However, in light of the empirical evidence in this section, it
seems that Yeltsin’s use of force in Chechnya was indeed a strategy
aimed at re-legitimizing his authority in the absence of a presidential
majority. His idea was to create, and then solve, a major crisis. If
Yeltsin did indeed operate under such a logic, it would explain why
he would ignore public opinion on the war, believing that the public
was wrong and that they needed to be led by someone who, “…as the
personal embodiment of the popular will that cannot be procedurally
ascertained in a time of crisis, has the authority to act—
unconstitutionally or even anti-constitutionally—with all the forceand
legitimacy of that originally popular will.”91 In this way, Russia’s war
with Chechnya was a demonstration of hyper-presidentialism that
developed out of the conflictual dividedminority government. Now let
me discuss a process that further demonstrates Russia’s movement

Id. at 200–201.
Id. at 97.
91 JOHN MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM, 139–140
(1999). (“Interestingly, this is Carl Schmitt’s problematic and, eventually
reactionary, conceptualization of the Reichspräsident in the Constitution of the
Weimar Republic, espoused in his Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre
von der Souveränität (Munich: Duncker and Humblot, 1934)”).
89
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toward non-democratic hyper-presidentialism: the technocratization
of the Russian cabinets under Yeltsin.
IV.

THE TECHNOCRATIZATION OF CABINETS UNDER YELTSIN
UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1998

As I discussed earlier, one of the probable outcomes of the conflict
in divided minority government is a move towards more
autocratic, presidential domination of decision-making. I submit
that this move is often characterized by the gradual technocratization of
cabinets, in which ministers appointed are not members of parties, but
rather, are non- party specialists chosen for their expertise in a specific
technical field (usually economics).The technocratization of cabinets
was popular in Latin America, when several countries inthe region
embarked upon the difficult path of economic adjustment.92 While the
inclusion of such non-party experts in government can be important
for assuring informed, specialized decision-making, appointing
technocrats to head government ministries may not be particularly
conducive to democratic consolidation, especially when it excludes
parties from government and narrows the decision-making
process to non-party specialists.93 In effect, technocratization
unlinks the cabinet from the legislature. Jean Blondel and Maurizio
Cotta’s study of eleven consolidated democracies found that in the
model of democratic government, “parties provide the pool of
eligibles, the people with long party careers among whom candidates
for government positions are to be selected, while [parties] control
also the selection (and deselection) process[s].”94 In presidential
systems, a president is free to choose his cabinet without having
to worry about the legislature’s confidence in the cabinet. In
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, however, the

See STEPHAN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC
ADJUSTMENT (Princeton Univ. Press 1992).
93 See JOEL HELLMAN, WINNERS TAKE ALL: THE POLITICS OF PARTIAL REFORM
IN POSTCOMMUNIST TRANSITIONS, 203-24 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992).
94 JEAN BLONDEL & MAURIZIO COTTA, PARTY AND GOVERNMENT: AN INQUIRY
92

INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND SUPPORTING PARTIES IN
LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES, 249 (1996).
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legislature’s lack of confidence in the cabinet can terminate it, and thus,
choosing party members for the cabinet, preferably party members
with good ties to the legislature, can be very important for the efficacy
and even the survival of the government. In Russia, President Boris
Yeltsin increasingly appointed technocrats to government posts—a
dangerous practice for democracy which began to reverse itself
somewhat with the appointment of Prime Minister Yevgeniy
Primakov. Vladimir Mau, former close aide to Gaydar and Chief of the
Economic Reform Center in Moscow, admitted that Russia in the early
1990s could easily be described as “constitutional authoritarianism,”
partly because “there’s no such thing as a government majority [in
Russia]. We have purely presidential government. They [the ministers]
are the ministers of the president.”95
On March 23, 1998, Yeltsin dismissed the cabinet in a “surprise”
decree, claiming that Russia needed a cabinet with renewed energy
and life, meaning that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had not pushed
economic reform far enough.96 Yeltsin’s snap decision came as a
surprise even to Chernomyrdin.97 Yeltsin then nominated Sergey
Kiriyenko to fill the post, a 35-year-old from Nizhny Novgorod who
was not an active member of any political party, but rather, was
known for his economic and managerial skills in one of Russia’s
regions. Yeltsin’s nomination of Kiriyenko met with very strong
resistance from the Duma, where the nomination had to be approved.
Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party, was the strongest
opponent to the nomination. The Communists’ usual allies, the
Agrarians, mainly supported Kiriyenko, not for his programme, but
rather, on the grounds that a rejection of Kiriyenko and a resulting
presidential dissolution of the Duma would allow Yeltsin to govern for
several months exclusively by decree. According to Article 111of the
Russian constitution, “[f]ollowing three rejections by the State Duma
of candidates submitted for the head of the government of the Russian
Federation, the president of the Russian Federation appoints a head of

Interview with Vladimir Mau, Chief of the Economic Reform Center in
Moscow, in Moscow (Mar. 17, 1998).
96 Boris Yeltsin, Televised Address, (Mar. 23, 1998).
97 See Interview, Galina Starovoytova, supra note 58.
95
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the government of the Russian Federation, dissolvesthe State Duma
and schedules new elections.”98
Moreover, Duma members were averse to a dissolution because
it would have meant giving up the benefits that came with Duma
seats, which included subsidized government apartments, cars and
travel.99 The Communists managed to reject the nomination of
Kiriyenko in the first two rounds of voting, trying to persuade Yeltsin
to nominate another candidate. Yeltsin called their bluff and
nominated Kiriyenko a third (and final) time, and most of the parties
acquiesced in Yeltsin’s decision and approved Kiriyenko. However,
the tension that mounted between Yeltsin and the Duma over
Kiriyenko’s approval meant that, although Kiriyenko was finally
approved, he did not have very much support in the daily politics of
the Duma, and he was considered to be somewhat of an intrusion in
their affairs. This is completely contrary to the premise of
parliamentary government, where a prime minister depends on
parliament for his support. As Kiriyenko himself admitted: “I don’t
owe anything to anybody, except to the president.”100
Yeltsin replaced the rest of the cabinet with mostly young
technocrats, which for some analysts “…confirms that President Boris
Yeltsin intends to remodel the governmentnot as a force in its own
right, but as a non-political economic bureau of the Kremlin.”101 Most
ministers had no political affiliation and faced a Duma majority
opposed to the kind of tax reform program that the Kiriyenko
government tried to develop. Important business tycoons who
controlled state resources, such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir
Potanin, resisted the Kiriyenko governments’ reforms from the
beginning, because at the simplest level, improved tax collection and
tax reform would have reduced their profits. In addition, the financial
oligarchs who controlled the most important banks in Russia expected

RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 421–22 (5th ed. 2020).
See IZVESTIYA, 1-2 (Russ.) (Mar. 28, 1998).
100 Mark Whitehouse, President Confirms He’s Tsar, THE MOSCOW TIMES (Apr.
25, 1998).
101 David McHugh, Technocrats Dominant in Cabinet, THE MOSCOW TIMES (Apr.
30, 1998).
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the government to print money to prop up the fledging Russian
banking system. Thus, by August 1998, the Russian government was
in deep financial trouble, did not have the political support it needed
from the Duma to reform the tax system, and was under strong
pressure from those in control of state resources to print money
and pursue a stronger industrial policy—the exact contrary to the
liberal reforms some experts argued were necessary to save the
economy from “sliding into the abyss.”102 The government called for
simultaneous rouble devaluation and default on its US $40 billion
obligations to Russian and Western holders of its high-yield treasury
bills.
On August 23, Yeltsin sacked the entire Kiriyenko government,
shielding himself from responsibility for the economic crisis.
Quibbling between Yeltsin and the State Dumaover the appointment
of a new, mutually acceptable prime minister took several weeks,
during which time the rouble continued to lose value. As Chrystia
Freeland of the Financial Times wrote, “[a]s the political establishment
haggles…the whole economy may be burning down.”103 Yeltsin
eventually nominated Viktor Chernomyrdin for the post, but he was
defeated twice in the Duma. On September 11, in Yeltsin’s third and
final chance, the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service,
Yevgeniy Primakov, was confirmed by the Duma in a vote of 315 to
63.104 Several important ministers appointed to this Primakov
government by presidential decree had no political affiliation. These
included the ministers of Health, Culture, Education and Regional
Policy, who were “[a]ll primarily professionals rather than politicians
who will follow a party line.”105 Mikhail Zadornov of Yabloko was
kept on as Finance Minister. Yuri Masliukov, a Duma deputy from the
Communist Party, was chosen as First Deputy Prime Minister,

Martin Wolf, John Thornhill, & Stephen Fidler, Comment and Analysis:
Meltdown, FIN. TIMES, 15 (Aug. 28, 1998).
103 Chrystia Freeland, All Bets Are Off, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at p. 6.
104 David McHugh, Primakov Approved as Prime Minister, THE MOSCOW TIMES
(Sept. 12, 1998).
105 THE MOSCOW TIMES (Oct. 1, 1998).
102
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bringing the Communists into a coalition government that enjoyed a
majority in the Duma—a first in post-communist history. The
increasingly assertive Primakov, who enjoyed considerable support in
the Duma, thus moved Russia into divided majority government,
where it remained for almost nine months. Eventually, Yeltsin became
wary of Primakov’s growingpopularity, both within the Duma and in
the general population, and dismissed him in May1999.
Why is this pattern problematic? History again provides the
example. The initial technocratization of the Russian cabinet is similar
to Weimar during the last years of the Republic (1930-1933). President
Hindenburg was an anti-party president, much like Yeltsin. As the
economic situation worsened in 1930, Hindenburg appointed an
increasing number of technocrats to Weimar’s cabinets, and the
legislature (much like the Russian Duma) gradually began to abdicate
responsibility to Hindenburg, refusing to pass votes of no-confidence
which would have either (1) forced them to take the reins in a divided
minority government, with all the difficulties that implied, or (2)
resulted in a legislative dissolution by the president. Therefore,
legislative parties under the last years of the Weimar Republic
avoided their responsibility to check presidential power and
instead tolerated presidential cabinets made up of non-party
technocrats (Fachkabinette). If we compare the party affiliations of the
eight main cabinet ministers under Ebert and Hindenburg, Ebert’s
party (the Social Democratic Party or SPD) held the plurality (27%) of
the ministries over his tenure, while over Hindenburg’s tenure, the
plurality (37%) of the major cabinet positions were held by non-party
technocrats, more than any other singleparty. In fact, von Papen and
von Schleicher were the last two prime ministers to be appointed
before Hitler, and both were non-party prime ministers. And most
importantly, very similar to Yeltsin, Hindenburg sacked his coalitionbuilding prime minister (Brüning)prematurely. In Russia just before
his dismissal, Primakov had been trying, with the support of a
legislative majority, to exercise more control over government
policymaking and encourage constitutional reform that would make
the president less powerful vis-à-vis the government and the Duma.
Had Primakov had a longer time horizon, a reasonable counter-factual
could be made that Primakov might have been successful in some of
these important reform efforts.
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Of course, both the historical circumstances and the international
context are quite different in Russia now than they were for Germany
in 1933. Certainly, Yeltsin’s considerations of the IMF loan policies
kept his political behavior within certain limits. Nevertheless, the
autocratic, unpredictable tendencies in Yeltsin’s personality have been
brought out by the incentives in semi-presidentialism. He towed the
line between some semblance of transitional democratic semipresidentialism—which kept him on acceptable grounds with the
international community—and outright autocratic rule, which
allowed him and his technocratic cabinets to dominate policymaking.
But in the long run, Yeltsin’s domination prevented Russia from
moving more consistently toward democracy and toward a more
stable and workable semi-presidentialism founded upon strong
legislative majorities.
Surveys conducted in Russia in 1996 found “[t]hat rising
dissatisfaction with the political system was due to fears over rising
crime, the injustices involved in the privatization programme,
embarrassment over continued political instability, and feelings of
political inefficac[y]”106 This dissatisfaction with the political system in
Russia is exemplified through low levels of participation, as evidenced
by the steady decrease in voter turnout over the last few years.107 In a
nation-wide survey conducted by VTsIOM in 1999, 63% of
respondents characterized the political situation in Russia as a “rise of
anarchy.” In another poll that year, 58% of respondents felt that
everything in Russia would have been better off if the country had
remained as it was prior to 1985.108 Other foundational building blocks
of democracy already suffer from a lack of trust on the part of citizens.
A public opinion poll taken in early 1998 by the Centre for the Study
of Public Policy asked people to rank Russian institutions on a trust
scale of 1 (no trust) to 7 (great trust). 81% of the people answering this

M. Steven Fish, The Predicament of Russian Liberalism: Evidence from the
December 1995 Parliamentary Elections, 49 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 191, 220 n.66
(1997).
107 See White et al., supra, at 120–21.
108 CTR. FOR THE STUD. OF PUB. POL’Y., Russia Votes (2015), www.russiavotes.
org.
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poll expressed low to no trust scores (1,2 or 3) forpolitical parties; 70%
expressed a low to no trust score for the legislature and 72% for Yeltsin.
These scores were slightly worse for parties and parliament than they
were for theelements of the Russian state (64% claiming no to little
trust), which in fact collapsed after the fall of the USSR.109
Alarmingly, 42% of those polled after the 1996 presidential
elections rated the pre-perestroika political regime more positively
than Russia’s current political regime.110
The continued weakness of the Russian state and its failure to
re-build itself was exemplified by the fact that tax collection in Russia
for 1997 was only 8% of GDP, well below the average of consolidated
European democracies and only one third of that in developing
countries.111 Moreover, 56% of Russians polled in 1998 about the ease
of tax evasion claimed there was “no need to pay” taxes, and a further
27% claimed that if theywere caught, they would only have to pay a
bribe.112 In addition, the Russian Mafia and the Russian banking
industry have developed their own coercive and financial structures—
parallel to those of the state—just as a shadow economy
developed in the USSR to supplement the ill-functioning command
economy of socialism.113 These structures permeate the political class,
as “…Russian public officials have gradually forged a new political
system where the notions of the rule of law and the public good are

See Richard Rose, New Russia Barometer VI: After the Presidential Election,
272 UNIV. OF STRATHCLYDE CTR. FOR THE STUD. OF PUB. POL’Y. (25 July-2 Aug,
1996); Michael McFaul, State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of
Privatization, 47 WORLD POL. 210, 228 (1995).
110 Rose, supra note 110.
111 THE ECONOMIST, Is Russia Going Wrong? (1997), https://www.economist.
com/leaders/1997/11/20/is-russia-going-wrong.
112 RICHARD ROSE, GETTING THINGS DONE WITH SOCIAL CAPITAL: NEW RUSSIA
BAROMETER VII 49 (1998).
113 An early EBRD evaluation of corruption in the CIS countries shows a positive
correlation between erratic or inconsistent government policy and high levels of
entrepreneurial corruption. See their report, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION &
DEV., TRANSITION REPORT 1997: ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 37–40 (1997).
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secondary to the necessity of keeping power and managing the state’s
wealth.”114
After one year in office, the new Russian President
Vladimir Putin has so farcontradicted the principles of democracy
rather than nourish them.115 The armed assaults on Media-Most’s
corporate offices and the Glasnost Foundation signal danger for civil
liberties. The appointment to prime minister of technocrat Mikhail
Kasyanov, reportedlyan ally of oligarch Boris Berezovskii, made many
democrats flinch. A political solution to the bloodshed in Chechnya is
more distant now that Putin has decreed Moscow’s direct control over
the republic for the next few years. The shocking imprisonment of
Media- Most’s Vladimir Gusinsky sent a startling message to those
critical of the Kremlin.116 And most recently, Putin’s botched treatment
of the Kursk nuclear submarine tragedy raised serious questions about
Russian governmental efficacy and accountability.
And yet, an interesting point here is that people seemed to
distrust Putin and the state less than they do parties or parliament. Part
of the blame for this situation must be placed on the deadlock between
the executive and legislative branches of government and the political
conflict that came out of prolonged placement in divided minority
government. The parliament, “…its lack of cohesion and
ineffectiveness are also a consequence of the fact that parliament is far
from being the key decision-making center. Rather, the latter is located
in the presidential apparatus—which may explain why some of the
sharpest political conflicts in 1996-97 were among Yeltsin’s closest
advisers, between Chubais and Alexander Korzhakov, for example, or
Chernomyrdin and Boris Nemstov, or Lebed and almost everyone
else.”117

Virginie Coulloudon, The Criminalization of Russia’s Political Elite, 6 E. Eur.
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What is this semi-presidential constitution and why is it so
vulnerable? A semi- presidential constitution is one in which the head
of state is a popularly elected president with a fixed term of office; and
the head of government is a prime minister who is responsible to the
legislature. The outstanding feature of semi-presidentialism therefore
is the existence of two executives. Executive power is shared between
the president and prime minister, and this sharing by definition
excludes a neat division, often leading to ambiguity. Moreover, the
legitimacy, accountability and responsibility of the two executives are
fundamentally different. The prime minister emanates from the
legislature and is responsible to it, whereas the president has greater
autonomy from the legislature and can survive without its approval.
This autonomy sets up incentives for the president to push his own
agenda, even if it means invading the prime minister’s domain. The
shared power, but unequal legitimacy and accountability, structure
theoretically predictable and empirically verifiable tensions into the
semi-presidential constitution.
Imagine, for example, disagreement between the president
and the prime minister, when it is often not clear which executive has
final decision authority. The president almost always has
constitutionally granted emergency powers, and constitutional power
vis-à-vis the military and the intelligence community. In crises
situations, it is possible that the president and the legislature issue
conflicting orders to the military, but the military may decide against
the decision of the elected majority and in favor of its chief
commander - the president. The unintended consequence may be
extended military rule and the suspension of democracy, especially in
countries with a history of military intervention in politics.
The greater the president’s scope of powers—particularly decree,
veto and emergency powers—and the lower the limitations on these
powers, the greater his possibility to govern without the prime
minister, or alternatively, with a hand-picked cabinet of allies.
Presidents who rely extensively on these powers over an extended
time move the regime out of semi-presidentialism into what I refer to
as non-democratic hyper- presidentialism. In hyper-presidentialism,
the extended use of emergency and decree powers violates the
democratic principles of participation and inclusion. It concentrates
decision-making in a small, opaque group of individuals under the
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tutelage of the president, and thus violates institutional guarantees for
polyarchy, particularly, “institutions for making government policies
depend on votes and other expressions of preference.” One observable
characteristic of hyper-presidentialism is the packing of the cabinet
with non-party, technocratic specialists rather than political party
representatives. This technocratization of the cabinet divides it even
further from parties in the legislature. The legislature may try to veto
a technocratic cabinet and presidential decrees, but the president in
the semi-presidential type usually retains dissolution power with
which shecan threaten a non-cooperative legislature.
V.

THREE SUBTYPES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM

These tensions between the president, the prime minister and the
legislature are inherent inthe structure of semi-presidentialism and are
therefore permanent. However, the presence of a legislative majority,
and an amicable relationship between the president and that majority,
can minimize the probability that these tensions emerge as serious
institutional conflict. Here I introduce three qualitatively different,
electorally generated subtypes within semi-presidentialism:
consolidated majority government (the president and prime minister
are from the same party/party coalition and have a parliamentary
majority); divided majority government (the prime minister has a
legislative majority, but the president is from the opposition); divided
minority government (neither the president nor the prime minister has
a parliamentary majority).
This all means that in order for the constitution to work in a way that
is supportive of democracy, the party system and electoral system of a
country with this constitution are absolutely crucial. Here are the
conditions that worked against this happening in Russia:
1.
The Absence of an Institutionalized Party System in
Russia
At least some minimal degree of party system
institutionalization is necessary for building presidential and
legislative majorities. The institutionalization of a party system is
characterized by the following: (1) regularity in the pattern of party
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competition (low volatility); (2) stability of party roots in society and
of citizens strongly and consistently attached to parties; (3) citizens and
other organized interests perceiving parties to be “the way to go,” and
accepting them as the legitimate intermediary and means of influence
in the democratic process; and (4) stability of party organization,
with party influence at both national and local levels, and party
elites’ loyalty to their parties.
Russia’s post-communist party landscape did not meet any
of these criteria.118 Instead, the Russian party system never allowed
for coherent and coincident presidential and legislative majorities.119
These characteristics included a problematic societal cleavage
structure; the predominance of independents in elections rather than
partycandidates; the divide between center and regional politics;
the high volatility and low discipline in parties and factions; and the

See Bruce L. R. Smith, Constitutionalism in the New Russia, in BRUCE L. R.
SMITH & GENNADY M. DANILENKO, LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW RUSSIA
4 (1993). For the counter argument that Russia did indeed begin to develop a party
system, “albeit a fluid and inchoate one,” see M. Steven Fish, The Advent of
Multipartyism in Russia, 1993-1995, 11 POST-SOVIET AFFS. 340, 340–383
(1995). Contra Fish, I would argue (following Sartori, Mainwaring) that one
cannot speak of a party system unless there is a minimal level of
institutionalization, which does not yet seem to be the case in Russia. Also see
Juan J. Linz, Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist
Europe, in RAY TARAS, POSTCOMMUNIST PRESIDENTS 1–14 (1997) for the
argument that Russia may be a stalemated, rather than unstructured, party system.
119 Brazilian parties during, and even after, the early years of democratization
suffered from a similar underdevelopment, the most decisive features of which
were most of the parties’ “…fragility, their ephemeral character, their weak roots
in society, and the autonomy politicians of the catchall parties enjoy with respect
to their parties.” As a consequence, and perhaps with lessons for Russia, Brazilian
politics (like other countries with weak party systems) has been plagued by
serious corruption problems, and powerful economic elites were able to influence
government by side-stepping the legislature. See Scott Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak
Parties, Feckless Democracy, in TIMOTHY R. SCULLY, BUILDING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS 354–398 (1995).
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anti-party position of the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and his
successors, including Vladimir Putin.120
The cleavage structure in Russian society, around which a
party system might have been built, was the first major obstacle to
institutionalization. There were no parties which could be considered
real “pairs of opponents,” as in some of the west European democracies
which have historically had left-right, or secular-religious, cleavages,
or both.In Russia, “this situation did not develop, as parties did not
generally call forth opposition from their logical alternatives.”121
Therefore, the parties that have come into play and hold seats in the
State Duma are, and have been, with the exception of the Communist
Party, what Duverger called internally created parties, because they
were born in the legislature, fathered by political elites.122 The
formation of these parties, for the most part, did not involve the
mobilization of any collective identities in Russian society and
consequently, these parties lacked a social base and “…are either less
likely, or simply less able, to establish a strong organizational
network at the mass level.”123
In the earlier years of democratization, parties tended to base
their program on the nature of the regime itself, or at least to posit
“reform” against resistance to reform (which is also sometimes a
cleavage between change to a new competitive political system versus
return to some authoritarian system of the past). Another issue around
which Russian political parties were developing was nationalism.124
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Univ. Press eds., 1998).
121 JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN
POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES 147 (1998).
122 PETER MAIR, PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE: APPROACHES AND INTERPRETATIONS
183–184 (1997).
123 Id.
124 Walter Laqueur, Russian Nationalism, 71 Foreign Affairs 103, 103–16 (1992);
see Astrid S. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian
Foreign Policy, in Celeste A. Wallander, The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy
After the Cold War, 41–68 (1996) (showing a typology of Russian nationalism).
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An emerging party system based on these elite structured cleavages
is problematic for democratic consolidation, because political
contestation around these cleavages is not always about policy, but
rather, about the rules of the game. Surveys conducted in 1993 and
1995 showed “…clear evidence of anti- democratic tendencies among
[party] supporters…In particular, supporters of theCommunist Party
and its presidential candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov, and the Liberal
Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, [were] distinguished
not just by theirexpected anti-market and anti-Western stance, but
by a far greater willingness, under certain conditions, to abandon
democracy.”125 In a consolidated democracy, there is a majority
consensus in political and civil society at least on one crucial point:
thatdemocracy is the best type of regime for processing differences
of opinion. In the firstfive years of Russian democracy, there was
strong evidence that (at least) the supporters of Zhirinovsky and
Zyuganov considered “…democracy as expendable, in light of the
magnitude of the problems facing Russia, rather than as the best way
to mitigate loss.”126
Another problem of the party landscape in Russia, which
worked againstinstitutionalization and thus against majorities, was
high party system fragmentation.127 In 1993, twelve political parties

Stephen Whitefield & Geoffrey Evans, Support for Democracy and Political
Opposition in Russia, 1993-1995, 12 Post-Soviet Affairs No. 3 218, 220 (1996).
126 Id. at 239.
127 See Joel M. Ostrow, Procedural Breakdown and Deadlock in the Russian State
Duma: The Problems of an Unlinked Dual-channel Institutional Design, 50
Europe-Asia Studies No. 5 793, 793 (1998) (The Duma has a dual-channel
institutional design, “[i]n which partisan factions and legislative committees are
parallel, autonomous channels of organization.”); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D.
McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need To
Know? 211–214 (1998) (Dual-channel systems may provide important checks
and balances in the legislative process. However, the high party fragmentation in
the Russian Duma, combined with linkage problems between parties and
committees, prevents the dual-channel design from being an effective
‘verification’ device and instead often leads to stalemate. On the utility of welldesigned dual-channel systems).
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managed to get seats in the Russian Duma.128 In addition to these
twelve parties, 31% of the seats were held by non-party
independents.129 A positive indication of party system development
came after the 1995 legislative elections, when independents in the
Duma were reduced to 12% of the seats. However, after the 1999
elections, independents held a whopping 25.3% of the Duma seats.130
There are other indicators of Russia’s poor party system
institutionalization. For example, many Russian parties have
competing national and local organizational structures, which
exacerbate the problems of holding together an already disintegrating
federal system.131 Indeed, “[n]one of the parties that came into
existence in 1990-91 . . . had developed into coherent national
organizations with regional branches. All underwentsplits, sometimes
more than once.”132 And even more problematic is the fact that for the
parties, “[t]he links with Moscow and the provinces were very
tenuous, if they existed at all.”133
Moreover, deputies don’t seem to care very much about their
local constituencies once elected. Surveys and interviews of State
Duma and Federation Council candidates,conducted by the Ford
Foundation Moscow in St Petersburg in 1993, showed that only
about 25% of the candidates polled thought about their
constituency after they wereelected. “The notion of working back in
the constituency with their electors, or in a party, had no place in their
thinking. Answers to the question, ‘How will you keep in touch with
your electors?’ revealed that, although a minority had clear ideas,

See Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and
Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism, 46
World Pol. 1, 10 (1993).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Peter C. Ordeshook, Russia’s Party System: Is Russian Federalism Viable?
in POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 12, 4 at 195–217 (1996) (noting the institutional and
non-institutional elements which work against federalism in Russia).
132 Mary McAuley, Russia’s Politics of Uncertainty, 273, (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1997).
133 Id.
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others had hardly thought about it…few had given any thought to
creating a social constituency for themselves.”134
Another problem impeding party system institutionalization
is high volatility. Between the 1993 and 1995 elections to the State
Duma, the average electoral volatility in terms of votes for parties was
47.0, almost eight times higher than the European average.135 Between
the 1995 elections and February 1996, the parties holding seats in the
Duma had experienced an average gain or loss of 22 seats because
parliamentarians elected under one party label changed party
affiliation.136 There is also high volatility with respect to parties’
voting patterns in the Duma. Parties have tended to support the
government on individual issues and pieces of legislation, rather
than according to a general program or platform. Both Zhirinovsky’s
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation under Zyuganov often supported government
policies from 1995-1997, despite their strongly anti-government preelection attitude.137 Such support was not necessarily in exchange for
compromises on policies and negotiated political bargains, but rather,
often in exchange for monetary bribes. As one government official
mentioned, “the Communists’ and Zhirinovsky’s votes are on
sale.”138 This type of corrupt majority building is an effect, as
well as a further permitting condition, of low party system
institutionalization.
The inchoate nature of the party system was exacerbated by
Yeltsin’s anti-party position and Russia’s electoral system (discussed
below), which has, at best, only weak incentives for majority-building.
These conditions work against the development of a solid political
society. This in turn works against democracy. Comparative lessons

Id. at 266.
Id.
136 See Stefano Bartolini & Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral
Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985, Appendix 2,
(Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007).
137 See White et al., supra note 30, at 237–39.
138 See John Barber, Opposition in Russia, in GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 32,
4 at 597–613, 607–09 (1997).
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from some Latin American cases demonstrate the connection: in
Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, inchoate party systems have contributed to
the presidential practice of “decretismo” and an overall decrease in
democratic governability; contrariwise, the institutionalized party
systems of Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica have been
crucial in helping to reduce corruption and establish a rule of law
in these countries.139 Inchoate party systems can also paralyze
parliamentary government, because they can produce uncertain
coalitionsand governmental instability. Thus, it seems bleak for the
prospects of Russian democracy that the party landscape is still
underdeveloped and non-institutionalized. As I explore in the next
chapter, this is particularly problematic under Russia’s semipresidential framework, because semi-presidentialism combines the
potentially unstable situation of divided minority government with
the possibility of presidential decretismo. Let me now turn to one of the
important mechanisms which could theoretically improve party
system institutionalization in Russia and discuss why it has not yet
been able to do so.
2.
Prospects for Majority-Building Electoral Formulae in
Russia
Under certain conditions, an electoral system can manufacture
legislative majorities. These majorities, in turn, decrease the chances
that the tensions inherent in semi-presidentialism emerge as conflict.
Are there any majority-building capacities in Russia’s electoral

Interview with Vladimir Mau, Former Close Aid to Gaydar & Chief of the
Econ. Reform Ctr. of Moscow (Mar. 1998) (In these chapters I make some use of
extended elite interviews as a research technique. Elite interviewing may be less
reliable than some other means of data collection, to the extent that the interviewee
is involved in the data he is reporting and thus the results may be biased. However,
the extended interview is nevertheless an extremely useful heuristic device and,
when supplemented by other data-collecting techniques, may provide invaluable
insight to a given problem or pattern of behaviour under investigation.) See
Charles F. Cannell & Robert L. Kahn, “The Collection of Data by Interviewing,”
in RESEARCH METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 327–380 (New York:
Dryden Press, 1953).
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systems? The State Duma’s electoral system combines two different
formulae: proportional representation (PR) and plurality (or first-pastthe-post). Half of the 450 Duma seats are contested in first-past-thepost, single member districts. The other half of the Duma seats are
contested under PR from closed party lists. There is also a 5%
threshold.140 We can thinkof the Russian formula as a combination of
light majority building with some PR. This combination is sometimes
called personalized PR, particularly in Germany, because it allows
voters to choose some individual candidates through the single
member district contests, rather than just choosing from among
impersonal, closed party lists.141
Due to the single member district element in this system, not
all parties will be awarded seats. Moreover, there is a threshold of 5%
for the PR contests. Rational parties that are not strong enough to win
single member district elections, or pass a 5% threshold in the PR
elections, thus have incentives to broker exchanges. For example,
where Party A realizes that its candidate has no chance in a District 1,
Party A can withdraw its candidate in that district and ‘offer’ its
support and its share of the electorate’s support to Party B’s candidate,
as long as Party B promises to do the same for Party A in another
district. These are electoral coalitions; whether or not these then
transfer to policy coalitions is another matter, but it is a start, and it
can build the idea of compromise and bargaining into the parties. In
a multi-party system that is well-institutionalized and relatively nonpolarized, the single-member district race and the threshold encourage
inter-party bargaining and trading among parties, which usually
reduces the number of parties (over the long run) in the system.
However, the problem in Russia with this electoral system has
simply been that the party system is too inchoate to react to the
aforementioned incentives. One indicator of theRussian parties’ failure
to react rationally to these incentives is evidenced by the high

Russian Electoral Law, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/russianelection-law.
141 BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA
26–27 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully eds., 1995).
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percentage of split-ticket voting (whereby a voter votes one party for
the PR race and another party for the single member district race) in
State Duma elections. By splitting their tickets, voters are often trying
to vote ‘usefully’ for a familiar, local notable in the single-member
district election, and then use their party list vote as a protest against
the party in power at the federal level. Split ticket voting also often
indicates the electorate’s weak attachment to parties.142 In order to
discourage split-ticket voting, parties must campaign strongly not
only for their party in the PR race, but also for their party candidatein
the single-member district races. In Russia this does not happen. The
single-member district elections have been personalized, and
personalities are often more important than party affiliations.143 The
evidence from the results of the 1993 State Duma elections shows
that parties either had not employed these strategies, or that the
electorate was anti- party, or both: 63% of the single-member district
seats were won by independents. The electoral rule in 1993 which did
not list party affiliation on the single-member ballot exacerbated splitticket voting, but it also appears that parties did not do much to
counter the high personalization of the elections.144
In the 1995 elections to the State Duma, 35% of the singlemember district seats were won by independents.145 The decrease in
the percentage of independents at first suggested an improvement.
However, the 1999 Duma elections had 51% of the single member
district seats captured by independents. Moreover, a closer look at
other indicators shows that this decrease from 1993 to 1995 was the
result of independent candidates creating new parties and labels for
themselves, rather than joining existing parties. Thus, while in 1993

See DIETER NOHLEN, WAHLSYSTEME DER WELT: DATEN UND ANALYSEN: EIN
HANDBUCH [WORLD’S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: DATA AND ANALYSIS: A MANUAL]
299–312 (1978). This combined system is similar to that practiced in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Venezuela, and New Zealand.
143 White, supra note 30, at 139–141.
144 Robert G. Moser, The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia,
13 POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 284, 295–98 (1997).
145 Stephen White, Matthew Wyman and Sarah Oates, “Parties and Voters in the
1995 Russian Duma Elections, Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 5 (1997), pp. 767–798,
at 783.
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there were 12 parties winning seats in the Duma, in 1995 there were
22 parties winning seats in the State Duma.146 That is to say, the
number of parties actually represented in the Duma was almost
doubled within two years. As some observers noted, “[i]n the early
months of 1995, […] the press was full of reports of the formation of
new political parties, rather than coalitions. […] Thus, even before a
single vote was cast, a substantial majority of parties were condemned
to winning nothing.”147
Electoral system reform has been suggested as a means of
building up and institutionalizing Russia’s party system. Perhaps the
PR elections need to be less proportional in order to encourage
majorities. Writing in 1993, Steven Fish suggested that “…a PR system
for legislative elections would generate parties…and perhaps even
create some organizational basis for overcoming the chaos and
hyper individualism that now enervate soviets on all levels.”148
However, since Fish had made this suggestion, fragmentation has
become a serious problem. A greater number of parties will not
necessarily translate into better parties, or into a structured party
system. Party proliferation, which can emanate from PR elections if
there are many social divisions and parties “in-waiting”, has little to
do with actual party development.
Party development involves expansion of national party
organization to local levels and parliamentarians’ commitment to their
party through, among other things, legislative discipline. Moreover,
recent research building upon the findings of Stepan and Skach shows
that countries using “less proportional systems are more likely to
survive [as democracies] than those with a highly proportional
system.”149 Finally, a larger number of political parties in a system
tends to be associated with a higher degree of polarization (ideological

White, supra note 30, at 139.
See id. at 123, 224–25.
148 Id. at 200, 203.
149 Steven Fish, Who Shall Speak for Whom? Democracy and Interest
Representation in Post-Soviet Russia, POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA, 43–44
(Alexander Dallin ed., 1993).
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or otherwise).150 The fact that Russia is a large and regionally diverse
federation adds another dimension to the Russian party system.151 The
Russian Federation approaches the conceptual opposite of what the
Italians refer to as “partitocrazia,” or partyarchy.152 In the literature on
parties and democracy, partyarchy is a system that appears to meet all
the formal requirements for a democracy, but the political parties
dominate to such an extent that the quality of democracy is questioned.
Parties in a partyarchy are highly disciplined and centralized, control
all nominations for public office, have penetrated all existing
organizations in civil society, and squeeze out any other organizations
linking government to society.153
In addition, the media are controlled or extensively monitored
by parties. Scholar Michael Coppedge argues that something close to
this ideal type characterized Venezuelan democracy, which is also a
federation.154 The Russian Federation, however, seems to be the
conceptual opposite of the ideal type partyarchy. First, Russian parties
play almost no mediating role between government and society, since
societal interests themselves are so fragmented, and since individual

See Giacomo Sani & Giovanni Sartori, European Political Parties: The Case
of Polarized Pluralism, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
137–76 (Joseph LaPalombora & Myron Weiner eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1966).
151 See Robert G. Moser, The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in
Russia, 13 POST SOVIET AFFAIRS 284, 291–92 (1997) (“The tensions between the
different regions of the Russian Federation and the centre have been reflected in
debates concerning the different electoral system that was to be chosen for the
Duma. The Federation Council, which had to approve the electoral law, and which
was dominated by regional Yeltsin appointees, insisted on limiting the number of
Moscow-based party members which could be on any party list to This was meant
to protect the interests of the regions in the overall agenda of the parties. Similarly,
the Federation Council also resisted scrapping the single-member districts. Within
the single-member districts, candidates had to collect signatures from 1% of the
voters, with no regional requirements. Party lists had to collect 200,000
signatures, with no more than 7% coming from any one unit.”).
152 See JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, DEMOCRACY, ITALIAN STYLE (1987) (discussing
Italy’s Christian Democrats and patriarchy).
153 Id. at 215–16.
154 See MICHAEL COPPEDGE, STRONG PARTIES AND LAME DUCKS 18–64 (Stanford
Univ. Press 1994).
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business oligarchs tend to control most state resources, including the
Russian media. Russian parties also play almost no role as mediating
institutions; more than 80% of Russians polled in 1998 distrusted
political parties.155 Second, Russian parties have little internal
discipline, and in elections held in single-member districts, have
almost no control over nominations. This occurs because most
parties—excepting the Communists and, in the past, the Agrarians—
have had inadequate grass-roots bases and were therefore “unable to
nominate credible, electable candidates to win single-member
districts.”156 If Italian partyarchy is one extreme end of a continuum,
then the Russian party situation, which we can call patriarchy, is on
the opposite end.157 Neither partyarchy nor patriarchy is fully
democratic.
Another element contributing to the patriarchy in Russia was
the absolute majority run-off system used to elect the president. As I
discussed earlier, this presidential electoral system may, under
conditions of inchoate parties, further polarize the electorate and
personalize elections instead of bringing parties together. Russia’s
1996 presidential elections, in which Yeltsin’s main opponent was
Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov was a clear example.158
The binary nature of the two-round electoral system structured this

Richard Rose, Getting Things Done With Social Capital: New Russia
Barometer VII, UNIV. OF STRATHCLYDE GLASGOW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF PUB.
POL’Y (1998), http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/view_item.php?id=303.
156 Marat R. Akopian, Choosing a Method of One’s Own Election: Explaining the
Choice of the Mixed Electoral System for Russia’s State Duma (1998)
(unpublished manuscript) (paper presented for the 1998 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Boston, September 3–6, 1998).
157 I call this “patriarchy” to emphasize the leader (usually the president but
perhaps also the prime minister) who, in the absence of strong parties, controls
government, or at the very least aims to control it, and assumes that he is
sovereign.
158 This system in France brought pre-existing, centre-leaning blocs closer
together. Yet it also seems to have encouraged the rise of extreme parties such as
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National, which has held several mayorships in France
and is taken seriously as an election contender (even for the presidential
elections).
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two-man race, which to many seemed more like a referendum on
Communism than an election based on the policy programs of the
candidates.159 In sum, the electoral formulae used in Russia have never
been the strongest for encouraging legislative majorities. But even the
incentives that do exist in the legislative electoral system are not
effective, because the party system itself remains unstructured, and the
Russian social fabric has problematic cleavages around which
coalition-able parties cannot really develop. Now I will turn to a third
crucial condition that impedes majority formation, the legacy of
Russia’s first anti-party president.
3.

Boris Yeltsin, and The Anti-Party President

In semi-presidential constitutions, it is crucial that a president
be actively supported by, and an active supporter of, a political party.
I showed elsewhere that to a certain extent even Charles de Gaulle, and
to a much greater extent the successive presidents of the Fifth
Republic, were all “party men” in this sense, and consequently were
often able to rally majority support in the electorate and, with help
from majority building electoral systems, in the legislature. This
enabled French presidents to operate under the least conflict-prone
subtype of semi-presidentialism much of the time. I have also,
elsewhere, looked at this condition in Weimar, and discussed how
Friedrich Ebert’s “party man” quality likewise helped minimize
conflict in Weimar’s early years, but how the non-party presidency of
General Hindenburg contributed to conflictual semi-presidentialism,
which may have eventually led to breakdown.
Unlike France, but similar to the latter years of Weimar, the
first directly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin never created a
political party for himself, nor did he join any of the parties which
began to form in Russia after 1990. Yeltsin had spent half of his life in
the Communist Party, but shunned the nascent parties of post-

See Yitzhak M. Brudny, In Pursuit of the Russian Presidency: Why and How
Yeltsin Won the 1996 Presidential Election, 30 COMMUNIST AND POSTCOMMUNIST STUD. 255, 255–75 (1997).
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communist Russia.160 In spite of the advice of two of his close advisors,
Sergey Shakhray and Gennadiy Burbulis, Yeltsin missed crucial
opportunities to form a party when his popularity was high—for
instance, after his election to the presidency of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in June 1991.161 As the Chief of
Operational Analysis of the Analytical Directorate in the State Duma
admitted, “[O]n several important instances, the President skillfully
avoided all chances to be part of a party.”162 For example, the DR
“provided crucial support for Yeltsin’s presidential victory in June
1991, yet his victory did not lead to its consolidation as the ‘party of
power,’ or indeed, to its consolidation as a party at all. Yeltsin clearly
felt more at ease working through his own ‘team’ free of political or
social control.”163 Unsurprisingly, an important faction of the DR had
formally moved into opposition against Yeltsin by 1993.164 This was to
be expected, since Yeltsin’s treatment of the DR demonstrated a lack
of forward-looking strategy and a lack of appreciation for the support
he received, which “makes no sense as an electoral strategy. To
communists, he remains a traitor. To liberals, he has abandoned all the
values that made him popular. Thus, he has eliminated his political
base.”165

David Hoffman, Russians Take the Life Out of Their Parties, WASH. POST,
Nov. 7, 1999, at A29.
161 See Lloyd, supra note 36, at 102.
162 Interview with Nikolay Sakharov, in Moscow, Russ. (Mar. 23, 1998); see also
Michael McFaul, Yelstin’s Legacy, 24 WILSON Q. 42, 53 (2000) (demonstrating
that Yeltsin had no interest in developing a presidential party).
163 RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 153 (4th ed. 2008).
164 See MICHAEL MCFAUL & SERGEY MARKOV, THE TROUBLED BIRTH OF
RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY: PARTIES, PERSONALITIES, AND PROGRAMS 66–77
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1993) (Nikolay Travkin, leader of the prowestern Democratic Party within the DR bloc, expressed concern as early as June
1991 over Yeltsin’s independent nature and zig-zag policies, warning that the
party would withdraw its support if it came down to that).
165 Daniel Treisman, Why Yeltsin Won, 75 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 64, 73 (1996)
(quoting Anders Aslund, Opinion, Almost Anyone is Better Than Yeltsin, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996 (§ A), at 21).
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In trying to understand why Yeltsin would eliminate his
political base without much concern for future consequences, it is
important to realize that Yeltsin viewed politics “not as a coalitional
process […] but as a zero-sum game of personal struggle for power.”166
This is a warlike, rather than peace-oriented and legalistic, view of
politics. In the former, force monitors persuasion, might establishes
right, and conflict resolution is sought in terms of the defeat of the
enemy—of the other ‘looked’ on as a hostis. In the latter, force is kept
in reserve as an ultima ratio, as a last and worst reason, and conflict
resolution is sought by means of covenants, courts and “rightful”
procedures. 167
Indeed, Yeltsin, most poignantly in Moscow in 1993 and in
Chechnya in 1994, demonstrated his warlike view of politics and his
propensity to resolve conflict through force and the defeat of the
enemy, rather than through compromise or by means of “rightful”
procedures. Yeltsin himself admitted that covenants, courts, and other
rightful procedures were alien, since “[t]he very word constitution was
a strange dish for us to taste.”168 Yeltsin was even extremely suspicious
of his inner circle and, not unlike Stalin, followed a pattern of
individual and isolated leadership based on perceptions of insecurity
and fear of the enemy, of the “other.” 169 In Yeltsin’s own words,

Hough, et. al., supra note 12, at 15.
GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 41-42 (1987)
(discussing Carl Schmitt’s concept of ‘the political.’). See also Carl Schmitt, Der
Begriff des Politischen (Duncker & Humblot ed., 1991) (1932).
168 See Yeltsin, supra note 1 at 216 (Yeltsin admittedly knew little about
constitutional government and legitimate power anyway. He said, “Who knew
five years ago what a referendum was in our country? What was ‘impeachment’?
How a parliamentary system differs from a presidential system? What legitimate
versus illegitimate authority meant? Besides a few legal scholars, I doubt that
anyone knew. Now people are learning bit by bit to figure out all these
constitutional subtleties.”).
169 See ANDREY GRATCHEV, L’EXCEPTION RUSSE: STALINE EST-IL MORT? (Paris:
Éditions du Rocher, 1997) (discussing the inertia of authoritarian style
government and the heritage of Stalin in today’s Russia); see also JOHN
MORRISON, BORIS YELTSIN: FROM BOLSHEVIK TO DEMOCRAT (1991) (for a
biographical account of Yeltsin).
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“people at the top generally have no friends. You develop a kind of
insularity and exercise incredible caution in dealing with people. All
of this is true of me—the insularity, the caution in speaking with new
acquaintances.170
Yeltsin’s justification for not attaching himself to any political
party was based on his belief that the president alone was the arbiter
of the system. According to Yeltsin, the president—by remaining
above parties—could safeguard against the “swing” in policies that
would inevitably result from party alternation in government.171 This
belief is evident from Yeltsin’s memoirs, where he writes that:
I would like to believe . . . that the majority of Russians
realize [that] the only definite guarantor of calm is the
president himself. That is, if they elected him, they
should stick to their choice. If the country is gradually,
though very slowly, coming out of the crisis, if the day
of judgment promised by both the left and the right is
not coming, then that means it is possible to live—and
live with that president.172
However, the fact that Yeltsin took the reins over so many
crucial decisions seems incongruent with the role of a genuine
arbiter.173 Moreover, a genuine arbiter is not antipolitical, as Yeltsin
seemed to be. Finally, even if we give Yeltsin the benefit of the doubt
and consider him to have had the role of arbiter, or of a heroic leader
like de Gaulle, “once the emergency is over, the heroic leader seems
out of place” and turns into “a flagrant reminder of the incapacity of
the political class to cope with serious problems successfully.”174
Indeed, Yeltsin’s domination of political decision-making de-

Yeltsin, supra note 1, at 180.
Interview with Lilia Shevstova, Political Analyst, Moscow Carnegie
Foundation, (Mar. 23, 1998).
172 Yeltsin, supra note 1, at 292–93.
173 See WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, MAX WEBER UND DIE DEUTSCHE POLITIK 362–
72, 375–79, & 398–405 (1959) (discussing the argument put forth by Max Weber
during the Constitutional debates in Germany in 1918).
174 Jack Ernest Shalom Hayward, Governing France: The One and Indivisible
French Republic 13 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd ed., 1988).
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legitimized the Russian political system by suggesting the incapacity
of the other institutions.
Had Yeltsin encouraged the development of parties to back
him in the legislature, Yeltsin might have avoided the precarious
periods of divided minority government that plagued his terms in
office. Instead, Yeltsin preferred to “stay unconstrained, and thus
capable of maneuver.”175 As a former, close aide to Yeltsin said, “[t]he
President has some sort of allergy to parties, and he wants to control
all decisions; he’s not a team player.”176
What have been the consequences of Yeltsin’s anti-partyness
for the development of democracy? First, Yeltsin tipped the balance of
institutional power in favor of the president, away from the
government and the legislature. He built a vertical, strongly
presidential power system in which parties do not play a central role.
Yeltsin restructured several institutions, such as the Security Council
and the Foreign Ministry, so that most decisions would come under
his direct command.177 Yeltsin’s presidential administration expanded
to over 3500 staff members by 1994, and there were numerous
committees and offices that took research and administrative tasks
away from the legislature and placed them under presidential
administration.178 Second, as a further means of extending his control
throughout the vast federation, Yeltsin appointed loyal cronies to the
posts of predstaviteli prezidenta (presidential representatives) or glavy
administratsii (heads of administration) in the regions, and relied on

Lloyd, supra note 36, at 15.
Interview with Galina Starovoytova, Member of State Duma and Political
Advisor to President Yeltsin, Moscow, Russ. (Mar. 23, 1998) (emphasis added)
(interview conducted just prior to her assassination in 1998).
177 See Alex Pravda, The Politics of Foreign Policy, in STEPHEN WHITE, ALEX
PRAVDA & ZVI GITELMAN, DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN AND POST-SOVIET
POLITICS 208, 225–27 (1994); Alexei G. Arbatov, Russia’s Foreign Policy
Alternatives, 18 INT’L SEC. 5, 5–43 (1993); Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott,
Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval 202–7 (1994).
178 Archie Brown, The Russian Crisis: Beginning of the End or End of the
Beginning?, 15 Post-Soviet Affairs 56, 63 (1999); Stephen White, Russia:
Presidential Leadership Under Yeltsin, in Postcommunist Presidents 38, 51-52
(Ray Taras ed., 1997).
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these representatives individually for support in the regions, and
collectively for support in the Federation Council.179 After 1995, Yeltsin
no longer had the legal power to appoint regional leaders (now
elected) or members of the Federation Council, who are now popularly
elected. However, Yeltsin continued to influence control over the
dismissal and replacement of governors in regions which had not yet
held elections. In the first half of 1996, for example, Yeltsin managed
to replace six governors.180
The clearest example of Yeltsin’s concentration of power at the
expense of other political institutions was his decision to use force in
October 1993 against the Congress of People’s Deputies, which had
decided to impeach him. A major faction in the Supreme Soviet at the
time was becoming increasingly reactionary, but Yeltsin’s
uncompromising attitude and “might over right” style of conflict
resolution pre-empted the road for compromise. Sergey Kovalev,
former Human Rights Commissioner under Yeltsin, suggested that
Yeltsin even encouraged the October 1993 conflict, since “all of
[Yeltsin’s actions in] 1993 were done to provoke Rutskoy and
Khasbulatov to take the first move toward force. Yeltsin was waiting
for this.”181 When Yeltsin recounts this period in his memoirs, we
immediately realize that Yeltsin did not understand the constitutional
interdependence between the president and the Congress of People’s
Deputies. Yeltsin writes:
Why is the word impeachment so terrible? After all if
the Congress passed such a motion it would have no
legal force. A popularly elected president could not be
removed from power by the Congress, especially this
Congress, which had long ago lost the people’s trust.
Furthermore, the subjective factor is not important

Lilia Shevtsova, Russia’s Postcommunist Politics: Revolution or Continuity?,
in THE NEW RUSSIA: TROUBLED TRANSFORMATION 5, 9 (Gail W. Lapidus
ed.,1995).
180 Steven Solnick, Will Russia Survive? Center and Periphery in the Russian
Federation, in POST-SOVIET POLITICAL ORDER: CONFLICT AND STATE BUILDING
58, 76 (Barnett Rubin & Jack Snyder eds., 1998).
181 Interview with Sergey Kovalev, Former Human Rights Commissioner, in
Moscow, Russ., (Mar. 26, 1998).
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here; what’s important is the legal substance of the
issue - the Congress does not have the power to
remove the president because it did not elect him. Any
schoolchild could understand that.182
Yeltsin’s isolated leadership and anti-legislature attitude set a
poor precedent for other political candidates. Simply “because Yeltsin
remained independent, others followed his example, believing that
democratic government could function without parties. This
neutrality by some of Russia’s most well-known figures (Yeltsin,
Popov, Stankevich, Sobchak) seriously retarded the development of
party affiliation.”183 One might have thought that Yeltsin would have
experienced a certain degree of political learning, realizing how
important parties are for real democratic power under semipresidentialism. However, with the advent of the 1996 presidential
election campaign, Yeltsin made no effort to enlist party support. His
only campaign technique consisted of what some analysts have
described as “buying” society—through more than 64 decrees issued
from January to June of 1996, which gave social benefits to certain
underprivileged (and large) constituencies.184 Yeltsin’s regional
headquarters, in these months prior to the election, became “‘a
glorified social services and janitor’s office combined’ that was
working hard to make the president ‘look kind and fair like Robin
Hood come alive.’”185
In comparative terms, many of the Latin American
democracies have seen similar populist campaign practices, especially
in the federated Latin American states where regional elites also act as
local representatives of the president.186 But even in these examples,
presidents have made pre-election “deals” with local elites and

Yeltsin, supra note 1, at 210 (emphasis added).
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184 Treisman, supra note 161, at 64–77.
185 Id. at 68.
186 See Populism and Polarisation Threaten Latin America, THE ECONOMIST
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pursued populist strategies through the existing parties.187 Even in
post-communist Georgia, President Eduard Shevardnadze launched
the Citizens’ Union in November 1993 in an effort to ensure political
support in the Georgian legislature. The presidential elections of 1995
gave Shevardnaze’s party the majority he needed to govern
democratically, and consequently, “[t]hroughout 1996, the new
parliament functioned cohesively and productively to enact key
legislation underpinning the foundations of civil society and of
economic reform.”188 In Russia, however, there is a continuous circle
which works against parties: the more that Yeltsin ignored parties and
alienated them from his decisions, the more directly dependent he was
on civil society, which was itself weak, unstable, and lacked
crystallized identities.189 Thus Yeltsin’s support group never
consolidated and remained, as it was during his first presidential term,

See Edward L. Gibson, The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and
Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina, 49 WORLD POL. 339-70 (1997).
(documenting how Argentina’s Menem and Mexico’s Salinas were successful in
using the support of their populist parties to pursue neo-liberal reforms, by relying
heavily on over-represented rural constituencies (which provided electoral
support) and attacking the under-represented urban constituencies (where most of
the hard-hit public-sector is located)).
188 Elizabeth Fuller, Georgia Stabilizes, 3 TRANSITION: YEAR IN REVIEW 82, 83
(1997).
189 See PETER MAIR, PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE 168 (1998); although there has been
an incredible growth in the number of NGOs in Russia since 1991, many are
struggling due to a lack of funds. According to a poll published in The Chronicle
of Philanthropy (May 1996), 75% of Russians polled could not name any charity.
As far as trade unions, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
(FNPR) retained many control mechanisms of its predecessor, the All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions. Moreover, there are almost no grass-roots
farmers groups given the very small percentage of private farmers. That said,
small business associations at the central and local levels are beginning to attract
more members and provide economic and other services, but there is still a long
way to go before these groups form the crucial horizontal links with each other
which would build a strong civil society fabric. See the report on Russian civil
society in KARATNYCKY, ET AL, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 317–18; see also ALFRED
STEPAN, RETHINKING MILITARY POLITICS: BRAZIL AND THE SOUTHERN CONE
(Princeton University Press, 1988) (discussing the importance of horizontal links
in civil society).
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“a conglomeration of individuals whose only unifying thread was
personal rapport with the president.”190
If we compare Yeltsin to the first directly elected president of
the French Fifth Republic, General de Gaulle, it becomes even clearer
that Yeltsin’s attitude towards parties did not even approach what is
necessary for minimizing conflict in semi-presidentialism. General de
Gaulle, not unlike Yeltsin, was the first president of a new republic,
had a high percentage of initial popular support, and was trusted with
the responsibility of re-equilibrating a system that was on the brink of
civil war. De Gaulle gradually realized how parties could help him
manage the potentially conflictual semi-presidential institutions by
giving him a majority in the legislature, and therefore, full, democratic
access to presidential powers. 191 Within the first years of the Fifth
Republic, there is evidence of de Gaulle reaching out to the Union pour
la nouvelle République (UNR), the party that took its inspiration from de
Gaulle and considered de Gaulle its leader.192 Over de Gaulle’s
presidency, he increasingly filled government cabinets with members
of the UNR, demonstrating support of the party.
The difference the party-man condition made in terms of de
Gaulle’s support in the first two legislatures of the Fifth Republic is
important. When we compare it to Yeltsin’s official party support in
the first two legislatures, to de Gaulle’s, the difference is striking. Of

Timothy J. Colton, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s All-Thumbs Democrat, in TIMOTHY
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(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).
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course, in the inchoate party landscape of Russia, there were several
parties that supported the president and the government although
they had no official affiliation with Yeltsin or support from him.
However, this meant that there was no certainty of support over time,
but rather, that support was bargained for in the State Duma on each
individual issue, most certainly adding to the already high degree of
uncertainty and volatility in the system.
Yeltsin’s successor to the Russian presidency, Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin, took office de facto on January 1, 2000, after
Yeltsin’s resignation. Putin was the popularly elected in the first round
of voting in March, 2000. Putin, like Yeltsin, has declared himself to be
“above” party politics. In an open campaign letter to the Russian
people published on his personal web page, Putin claimed that “[t]he
poverty of peoples cannot be justified by any references to the purity
of party principles, whether ‘Right’ or ‘Left’ ones.” The party that has
thus far supported Putin most steadfastly—Yedinstvo (Unity)—still has
no real political program and lacks organizational strength. It is, in that
sense, weaker than the Communist Party, and less well-grounded at
the regional and local levels. Moreover, before his election, Putin
suggested that democracy was “dictatorship of the law,” evoking
images—albeit distant ones—of the Latin American dictators of the
1970s, for whom some sense of legality, but not democratic legitimacy,
was integral to the regime. Human rights advocates, including the
current Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Oleg Mironov,
express concern over Putin’s plans for a “strong state.” Recently Putin,
adding to this concern, told Russians in a public address that they have
been too optimistic about achieving democracy quickly. What’s more,
Putin’s centralization-of-power, “strong state” plan, as well as some of
his recent ministerial appointments, will facilitate informal
mechanisms of influence and representation which will continue to
side-step and delegitimize political parties and courts. Thus, Putin
was, problematically, just as much of a non-party man as Yeltsin had
been during the entire first decade of Russian democracy.
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Table 2: Three Crucial Conditions for Minimizing Conflict in
Semi-Presidentialism.
Postcommunist Russia 1991-1999
One:

Two:

Three:

Institutionalization of the Majority- Building Integration of
Presidents
Party System

Capacity of the Electoral into the Party System

Very Low

VI.

Low

Non-Existent

CONCLUSION

As supported by the data discussed above, Russia had conditions
that keep it in divided minority government, the most problematic
subtype of the semi-presidential constitution, for the first decade of its
transition from non-democratic rule. Russia’s chances for moving
toward democracy under semi-presidentialism were and still are
today clearly less than the chances of moving further toward a nondemocratic alternative, or remaining in a state of arrested transition,
unless there are major changes that would involve developing an
institutionalized party system (endogenously), changing electoral
rules to promote political parties and party coalitions, amending the
constitution to give less unilateral power to the president, and
ensuring that future presidents identify with a political party and are
willing to set a tradition of not using their constitutional powers
beyond their limits as a substitute for a Duma majority. A tall order for
a country spanning many time zones—a country so rich in culture and
potential, awaiting its true democratic birth.

